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Aesthetic Regulation Under the

Police Power: The New General
Welfare and the Presumption of
Constitutionality*
Beverly A. Rowlett**
I. INTRODUCTION

Governmentally imposed restrictions on the use of private
property have grown greatly in both number and complexity in the
more than half a century since modern zoning regulations first
made their appearance in the United States.1 As restrictions have
burgeoned, the question of what are legitimate ends of such restrictions has become increasingly important. It is well understood
that the authority to regulate the use of land is based on the inherent police power of the sovereign states, 2 an authority that may
validly be delegated to municipalities by state enabling legislation."
It is equally well understood that although the scope of the police
power cannot be precisely defined-since it is subject to change in
response to changing political, economic, and social conditions4-the purposes of police power regulations that are univer* This Article is based upon a thesis written in partial fullfillment of the requirements
for the LL.M. degree at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tennessee, Knoxville; B.A., 1974, Arkansas
State University; J.D., 1977, University of Arkansas; LL.M., 1980, University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign.
1. New York City enacted "[w]hat is generally regarded as the first modern zoning
ordinance" in 1916. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DrMlmErr CONTROL LAw
§ 28, at 67 (1971).
2. See 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 2.01 (4th ed. 1980).
3. Every state has enacted such legislation, which is generally modeled after a standard act published by the Department of Commerce in 1926. See ADVISORY Comrrnm ON
ZONING, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT (Department of Commerce 1926), reprinted in 4 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 2, at 765.
4. State v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 150, 204 N.W. 569, 570 (1925), aff'd per curiam,

273 U.S. 671 (1926); Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 226-27, 275 N.E.2d
585, 589, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (1971).
5. The term "regulation" is used in this Article instead of "zoning" since some of the
cases discussed involve land use restrictions other than zoning ordinances. The vast majority
of the cases, however, do involve zoning ordinances.
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sally recognized as legitimate are the promotion of health, safety,
morals, and the general welfare. e While "health" and "safety" are
relatively easy to define, and since the promotion of morals has
rarely, if ever, been relied upon in recent cases to justify land use
regulation,7 the determination of what may be done in the name of
the nebulous "general welfare" has proved an intractable problem
for those courts called upon to assess the validity of regulations
having no basis in health, safety, or morals. These general welfare
regulations have become more prevalent as land use regulations
have become more sophisticated, and they have primarily been
designed to achieve aesthetic objectives. Hence, the question of
whether the police power may be exercised solely or primarily for
aesthetic purposes has been much litigated,8 and the conflicting
and confusing responses of the courts have been the subject of
much commentary.9
To determine whether the purpose of a police power regulation is solely or primarily aesthetic, it is not necessary to inquire
into the motives of the enacting body. Dukeminier 0 proposed a
simple test: if the regulated land use would not be offensive to a
blind man, then its primary offense-the reason for its regulation-is its "unaesthetic" nature.1 1 In other words, if the regulated
activity poses no real threat to the public health, safety, or morals,
the reason for the regulation must be aesthetics. Of course, even a
blind man may be offended by an unaesthetic land use if it happens to be the ugly house next door that depresses the value of his
own property or an unsightly use that causes a thriving tourist industry to fail and thus harms the area's economy. These economic
impacts of unaesthetic land uses, however, cannot be classified as
the primary reasons for regulation, for as discussed below,1 2 the
6. See, e.g., City of Euclid v. Fitzthum, 48 Ohio App. 2d 297, 298-301, 357 N.E.2d 402,
404-05 (1976). See also A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 3, at § 3.

7. See City of Pepper Pike v. Landskroner, 53 Ohio App. 2d 63, 70, 371 N.E.2d 579,
583 (1977). Regulations concerning sexually oriented commercial enterprises, which are arguably based in part on the promotion of morals, have been upheld by the courts in recent
years. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Stansberry v.
Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1980). The promotion of morals was relied upon as a justification for regulation in several early cases. See text accompanying notes 56-64 infra.
8. See cases collected at Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968).
9. For an extensive bibliography of the literature, see 12 WmA FoRmsT L. Rzy. 275
(1976).
10. Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal,20 LAw & Cowrzup.
PRO. 218 (1955).
11. Id. at 223.
12. See text accompanying notes 48-50 infra.
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economic impacts of aesthetic regulation' s are purely derived from

the aesthetic impact. The desirable economic benefit is attained
only because the regulation tends to make the regulated area aesthetically pleasing, or at least pleasing in terms of the market's

perception of beauty.
Ascertaining the primary purpose of a regulation is a neces-

sary step in applying the well-recognized test of the constitutionality of police power regulations: a regulation is unconstitutional if it
is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."' 14 Two
basic inquiries must be addressed in applying this test: first,
whether the purpose of the regulation is a permissible police power
purpose; and second, whether the regulation is a reasonable means
of furthering that purpose.1 5 When a regulation is challenged as

having aesthetics as its purpose, the first inquiry alone is often dispositive under the present majority rule. Nevertheless, while aesthetics alone will not justify an exercise of the police power, it may
be a valid secondary objective if the regulation primarily serves
one of the traditional police power purposes.1 6
13. The terms "aesthetic regulation" and "primarily aesthetic regulation" are used
interchangeably throughout this Article.
14. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
15. Courts frequently use the term "unreasonable" as a generic term to describe regulations that are arbitrary, confiscatory, or discriminatory. See 1 A. RATHKOPI, supra note 2,
§ 4.02, at 4-7. The basic constitutional issue in the aesthetic regulation cases is whether the
regulation denies substantive due process. Rathkopf summarizes the instances in which such
a denial may be found:
(1) The purpose of the restriction does not fall within the ambit of those purposes for
which the zoning power has been conferred.
(2) The manner of achieving a permitted purpose has not been authorized.
(3) The restriction goes so far as to confiscate the most substantial part of the value
of the property or deprives its owner of all reasonable use thereof.
(4) It is arbitrary in that it fails to achieve the purpose for which it was intended.
Id. at 4-3. Although (2) and (3) may be involved in some aesthetic regulation cases, (1) and
(4) identify the problems basic to all such cases and are essentially the same as the two
inquiries identified in text. The second inquiry, however, is somewhat broader than that
identified in (4). A regulation may be an unreasonable means of furthering a permissible
purpose not only if "it fails to achieve the purpose" but also if the public benefit of achieving the purpose is slight compared to the private burden imposed by the regulation. See 1
R. ANDxRSON, AMEIcAN LAW OF ZONMNG § 3.23 (2d ed. 1976).
16. See generally 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 2, § 14.01. It should be noted that some
of the jurisdictions treated as following the majority rule-i.e., that aesthetic considerations
alone are not a legitimate objective of regulation-in this Article and in other collections of
cases may have dealt with the "aesthetics alone" issue only in dicta. Moreover, the jurisdictions treated as following the minority rule in this Article do not include those in which the
courts, although implying a willingness to uphold regulations based solely or primarily on
aesthetic considerations, did not do so and instead stressed the economic benefits derived
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The basic reasons for the refusal to accept aesthetics as a sole
or primary justification for regulation are substantial. Unlike the
protection of the public health, safety, and morals, the promotion
of aesthetic values has been considered a matter of luxury and indulgence, rather than a necessity.17 Furthermore, the aesthetic
judgment is subjective; what one city council considers beautiful,
the next may consider ugly. 18 The courts have been understandably reluctant to place themselves in the position of reviewing the
reasonableness of decisions for which no objective criteria of reasonableness can be articulated. These considerations, coupled with
the strong Anglo-American tradition of noninterference with the
rights attendant to private property ownership, have provided sufficient reason for many courts to invalidate primarily aesthetic
regulations.
Even though the rule that the police power may not be exercised to achieve aesthetic objectives is still followed in the majority
of states, in the quarter century since the Supreme Court eloquently described the role of beauty in the promotion of the general welfare in Berman v. Parker the courts have given expanded
meaning to that "traditional" police power purpose; some courts
have even held that aesthetics alone is a sufficient justification for
an exercise of the police power.2 0 More commonly, the courts have
from aesthetics or incidental health and safety considerations. Because of the difficulties of
interpreting some of the aesthetic regulation cases, some room exists for disagreement concerning whether certain jurisdictions follow the majority or minority rule. See generally
Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of JurisdictionsAuthorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 U. Mo. KAN. Crry L. REv. 125 (1980), finding sixteen jurisdictions that
have accepted the rationale that aesthetics alone may justify regulation, nine that have rejected it, sixteen in which it is an open issue, and ten in which there are no reported cases.
17. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Ad. & Sign Painting Co., 72
N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (1905).
18. See City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 661-62, 148
N.E. 842, 844 (1925):
Certain Legislatures might consider that it was more important to cultivate a taste for
jazz than for Beethoven, for posters than for Rembrandt, and for limericks than for
Keats. Successive city councils might never agree as to what the public needs from an
aesthetic standpoint, and this fact makes the aesthetic standard entirely impractical as
a standard for use restriction upon property. The world would be at continual seesaw if
aesthetic considerations were permitted to govern the use of the police power.
19. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See text accompanying notes 35-37 infra.
20. The leading case is People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d
734 (1963), appealdismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). See also John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar,
453 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Me. 1978); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825
(1967); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Ad. Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709
(1975); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 324 A.2d 113
(1974); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Upper Arlington, 55 Ohio App. 2d 27, 379 N.E.2d 266 (1977)
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maintained the traditional rule, but have nonetheless upheld primarily aesthetic regulation by reasoning that the general welfare is
promoted because the regulation has a desirable economic impact;
it tends either to protect property values21 or to promote tourism.22
In some cases, a health or safety justification may be relied upon,
even though the regulation was enacted primarily to combat unaesthetic land uses and the incidental health or safety effects of the
regulation are minimal or nonexistent.2 3 In any event, the initial
constitutional hurdle, the requirement of a permissible police
power purpose, is usually overcome.
By finding that a primarily aesthetic regulation's economic impact furthers the general welfare, or that the regulation has beneficial health and safety effects, the courts avoid holding that aesthetics may be the sole or predominant objective of police power
regulation. The refusal formally to accept this proposition, however, does not necessarily mean that it has not been accepted in
fact, since any alleged economic impact of such a regulation arises
from, and is wholly derived from, its aesthetic impact. Furthermore, the alleged economic, health, or safety benefits are often
nonexistent or at least unproven. Because land use restrictions are
presumed constitutional by the reviewing court,2 ' the courts rarely
require proof of the "nonaesthetic" economic, health, or safety justifications upon which they rely in upholding land use regulations.
Even if the legislative body presents no evidence to establish that
the "nonaesthetic" justification in fact exists, the regulation will be
upheld on the basis of this alleged justification unless the contesting landowner meets a rather extraordinary burden of proof
and shows that it does not exist.25 The "nonaesthetic" justification,
therefore, usually remains undemonstrated, and because any evidence on the matter, if presented, might be extremely speculative
or conflicting, 6 a contesting landowner may find it quite difficult
to believe the court that tells him that his land use is not being
restricted on the basis of aesthetics alone.
If the court finds that the restriction is aimed at a permissible
(aesthetic regulation valid when regulated use is in "gross contrast" to permitted uses and is
"patently offensive"); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
21. See text accompanying notes 93-143 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 144-53 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 154-72 infra.
24. See generally 1 R. ANDERsoN, supra note 15, at § 3.14.
25. See generally id., at § 3.16; note 53 infra, and accompanying text.
26. See text accompanying notes 98-109 infra, describing the difficulty of proving the
"nonaesthetic" justification of protecting property values.
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police power purpose by ascribing a "nonaesthetic" objective to the
regulation, the second inquiry of the constitutional test is then accordingly misdirected. Instead of considering whether the regulation is a reasonable means of achieving the primary aesthetic objective, the courts inquire whether the regulation is a reasonable
means of achieving the "nonaesthetic" objective of economic stability or the tangential objective of health and safety. In short, the
refusal to recognize aesthetic regulation for what it is precludes
fair review of the constitutionality of such regulation; both constitutional inquiries are addressed to fictional or insignificant issues.
This Article will examine the existing methods of analysis employed by courts in reviewing primarily aesthetic regulations, as
well as the way in which those methods have been affected by the
courts' continually evolving interpretation of the concept of general welfare. The Article argues that in many cases in which regulations based solely or primarily on aesthetic considerations have
been upheld, the essential constitutional inquiries have been misdirected. This is because "nonaesthetic" justifications are asserted
that either are wholly derived from aesthetic benefits, or have no
basis in fact-and need none because of the presumption of constitutionality. Because the more recent interpretations of the general
welfare provide new "nonaesthetic" justifications, the traditional
rule that aesthetics alone is not a proper basis for regulation now
has virtually no discernible effect on the outcome of the aesthetic
regulation cases.
This Article suggests that, although the minority rule that a
regulation may be based solely on aesthetics is laudable, the alternative, traditional rule is certainly not without merit. The purpose
of this Article is not to criticize the traditional rule itself, but
rather the manner in which it is applied by the courts. This Article
argues that, under either rule, aesthetics should be taken into account in weighing the significance of the public interests in regulation against the private interests in freedom from regulation. This
balancing test, however, is unduly weighted in favor of the validity
of the regulation by the presumption of constitutionality-permitting a court to assume the existence of "nonaesthetic" economic,
health or safety purposes for the regulations that may have little or
no basis in fact. When such presumptions are indulged by a court
whose formal rule is that aesthetics alone is insufficient, the rule
becomes meaningless, and regulations based solely or predominantly on aesthetic considerations are inevitably held valid. This
Article identifies some of the tenuous "nonaesthetic" considera-
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tions that have been presumed in recent cases and suggests that
unless the courts are willing to accept that aesthetics alone is sufficient, acceptance of tenuous "nonaesthetic" rationales must be
avoided if the traditional rule is to have meaning.
Moreover, even if aesthetics alone is accepted as a sufficient
basis for regulation, the presumption of constitutionality should
not be allowed to obscure the fact that in some cases the governmental interest in aesthetics is insignificant compared to the competing interests of the regulated landowner. Many cases have
shown that the presumption of constitutionality need not be
blindly and rigidly applied; courts can and do refuse to accept governmental assertions on behalf of legislation that are unsupported
by convincing evidence in the record.2 The kinds of evidence that
should be required by courts reviewing the validity of aesthetic
regulations also will be examined.
II.

PERMISSIBLE POLICE POWER PURPOSEs: EMERGENCE OF THE
GENERAL WELFARE

A.

The Concept of General Welfare

Although currently the promotion of the general welfare is a
convenient and frequently used vehicle for the promotion of aesthetics, in the early twentieth century the general welfare concept
was rarely recognized as a justification for police power regulation
independent of more traditional police power purposes. Many of
the early aesthetic zoning decisions did not even mention the general welfare in their lists of permissible police power purposes, recognizing as valid only the promotion of health, safety, and
morals.2 8 Gradually the courts came to add general welfare to the
list, perhaps partly in response to the Supreme Court's discussion
of the police power in the landmark zoning case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 29 In upholding the validity of compre-

hensive zoning regulations in general, the Court stated that "the
ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations,
must find their justification in some aspect of the police power,
asserted for the public welfare."30 The Court went on to conclude
that the particular ordinance in question could not be found to
have "no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
27.
28.
29.
30.

See notes 183-95 infra, and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 639, 149 N.E. 30, 33 (1925).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 387.
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or general welfare." 1 Although it has been asserted that the Supreme Court in Euclid recognized the general welfare as an independent justification for the ordinance-since "[t]he promotion of
health, safety, and morals will provide justification for only a primitive type of zoning" 32- the reasons given by the Court for upholding the comprehensive ordinance clearly indicate that the Court
was focusing on health and safety.33 Indeed, the Court's mention of
"public welfare" and "general welfare" seemed largely superfluous.
Likewise, although the state courts came regularly to name the
general welfare as a permissible ground for exercise of the police
power, the term remained largely undefined and seemingly not a
creature independent of the traditional health, safety, and morals
grounds. Whatever the Euclid Court meant by "general welfare,"
and whatever state courts meant when they routinely listed the
general welfare as a permissible purpose of the police power, it
clearly was not acceptable as a sole basis for regulation if promotion of the general welfare was nothing more than the promotion of
aesthetics. 4
Almost thirty years after the ambiguous reference to public
5 set
welfare in Euclid, the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker"
forth a now-famous description of what is encompassed by the
term. In upholding the validity of an urban renewal plan for the
District of Columbia, the Court stated:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive ....
The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well
as carefully patrolled."6

31. Id. at 395.
32. 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 430, 430 (1965).
33. [T]he segregation of residential, business and industrial buildings will make it
easier to provide fire apparatus suitable for the character and intensity of the development in each section; ... it will increase the safety and security of home life; greatly
tend to prevent street accidents, especially to children, by reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential sections; decrease noise and other conditions which produce or intensify nervous disorders; preserve a more favorable environment in which to
rear children, etc.
272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
34. All courts recognized, however, that the mere existence of a secondary aesthetic
motive would not invalidate an ordinance: "Beauty may not be queen, but she is not an
outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect. She may at least shelter herself under the
wing of safety, morality, or decency." Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 332, 182 N.E. 5, 6
(1932).
35. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
36. Id. at 33.
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Although it concerned eminent domain rather than zoning,
Berman became extremely influential in aesthetic zoning cases.37
Also of considerable influence has been the wealth of legal commentary critical of the early aesthetic zoning cases,38 most notably
a 1955 article by Professor Dukeminier, 9 who denounced the judicial technique of upholding predominantly aesthetic regulation on
tenuous or fictional nonaesthetic grounds. 0 The effect of such
commentary, as well as increased popular demand for some forms
of aesthetic regulation, has been to shift dramatically judicial attitudes toward upholding these regulations in the post-Berman
years.
1.

Aesthetics and the General Welfare: Competing Judicial
Theories

Although a few courts now hold that regulation solely or
predominantly for aesthetic purposes is a valid use of the police
power to promote the general welfare,4 1 most courts upholding ostensibly aesthetic regulation link aesthetics to another permissible
police power purpose. In doing so, these courts continue to adhere
to the majority rule that aesthetics is a legitimate objective only if
other, more traditional objectives are also present. Aesthetic regulation is said either to promote some other aspect of the general
welfare-characterized broadly as producing an economic impact:
protection of property values, promotion of economic growth, or
preservation of an area's character 42 -- or to further one of the other
traditional health, safety, or morals goals. When the general welfare is involved, some cases treat the promotion of aesthetics and
an accompanying economic impact as two indistinguishable and
37. One observer recently stated:
In recent years, the words "beautiful as well as healthy" have become something of a
talisman for courts forced to decide the validity of regulations that serve solely or
predominantly aesthetic purposes. Rather than inquire into the nature of the individual and community interests at stake, courts have used the discretion that Berman
affords state and local governing bodies as a basis for upholding almost any aesthetic
regulation.
Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62
MINN. L. REv. 1, 2 (1977) (citation omitted).
38. See, e.g., 12 WAKm FoREsT L. Rav. 275 (1976).
39. Dukeminier, supra note 10.
40. Dukeminier's primary criticism was of the early billboard cases and cases dealing
with the prohibition of overhanging signs in fashionable shopping areas. Id. at 219-23.
41. See, e.g., cases cited at note 20, supra.
42. See 8 IND. L. Rav. 1028, 1034-39 (1975), and cases cited therein.
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mutually dependent aspects of the same general welfare goal.4" In
such cases the aesthetic considerations are held legitimate because
to protect beauty is to stimulate the economy, to preserve the
character of an area, or to protect property values. Other decisions
view the aesthetic and economic purposes as entirely distinct categories within the general welfare concept, upholding regulations
that happen to serve both goals while maintaining that the aesthetic considerations alone would be insufficient." In these cases
the aesthetic purpose is considered legitimate because beautification is merely an incidental objective of the regulation. The primary objective is, for example, to promote the general welfare by
economic growth or residential character preservation.
An evaluation of the legitimacy of the two alternate ways in
which courts have upheld aesthetic regulation-either by declaring
aesthetics alone to be sufficient or by requiring the presence of
some more traditional purpose-suggests two possible ways to analyze the decisions. The first theory is that while either class of decisions produces a sound result, the concept of aesthetics is not
really necessary to the decisions, and the superfluous reference
only confuses the issue. Since a regulation that promotes aesthetics
either inevitably promotes some element of the general welfare or
will in some manner further one of the more traditional police
power purposes, it will be upheld for that reason alone. 45 Proponents of this theory would argue that courts need never consider
43. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 861, 610 P.2d 407,
413, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 516 (1980) (U.S. appeal pending): "[A]ny distinction between aesthetic and economic grounds as a justification for billboard regulation must fail." The California Supreme Court also found as a matter of law that the prohibition of billboards promoted traffic safety, but held that even if such was not the case, the regulation was valid. Id.
at 859, 610 P.2d at 412, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 515. Another class of cases closely related to these
are those in which the court purports to accept aesthetics alone as a valid basis for regulation but then relies heavily on such factors as the protection of property values or the promotion of tourism. See 18 U. FLA. L. Rxv., supra note 32, at 435-36, and cases cited therein.
44. E.g., City of Pepper Pike v. Landskroner, 53 Ohio App. 2d 63, 74-75, 371 N.E.2d
579, 586 (1977).
45. Hagman suggests that "unless the attorneys submit the case on an aesthetics alone
basis, or the court chooses to limit its decision to that basis, it is perhaps never necessary to
decide the issue on that ground alone." D. HAGmAN, supra note 1, § 48, at 94 (1971). See
also 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 2, § 14.01, at 16-17 (citation omitted):
It therefore appears of little moment whether a court reiterates the rule of the older
cases that while a regulation may not be based upon aesthetics alone, aesthetics may be
incidental to the otherwise valid use of the police power, since ordinarily a regulation
which is found to provide for the appropriate use of property, or to furnish light and
air, or to conserve the value of property, will be found to promote the appearance of
the community and to be based, in substantial part, upon consideration of the aesthetic
elements involved.
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aesthetics to be a permissible police power purpose since some
more traditional purpose is always present.

The second theory is that the decisions that appear to follow
the traditional rule-either by treating aesthetic purposes and
other general welfare purposes as synonymous or by finding the
aesthetic justifications to be merely incidental to economic, health,

or safety considerations-are unsound for either or both of the following reasons: (1) the economic or other general welfare impact of
an aesthetic regulation is purely derived from the aesthetic impact,
and therefore to fail to recognize the aesthetic objective as the primary or sole purpose of the regulation is to indulge in fiction;46 or
(2) the asserted "nonaesthetic" grounds for upholding a regulation
are either tenuous or nonexistent, or in any event not provable
with any degree of definiteness. 47 The contention, then, is that the
purported independent purpose of the regulation is actually either
entirely dependent on the aesthetic purpose or unprovable. A proponent of this theory would argue that the only legitimate *ay to
uphold an aesthetic regulation is simply to find that aesthetics
alone is a legitimate police power objective.

2. Applying the Theories: Two Typical Rationales
The validity of both theories depends upon the manner in
which the constitutional standard is applied to the accompanying,
46. Michelman argues quite forcefully that those cases which upheld a regulation because it protected property values and declared aesthetics merely incidental were based on
escapist reasoning that evades the real issues. The effect on market value, after all, is
derivative or symptomatic-not primary or of the essence. If the activities curbed by
the regulation would otherwise make the surrounding property less valuable, it must be
because those activities would radiate some kind of undesirable impact. If that impact
is received and felt through visual sensibility, then the "economic" interest in question
simply masks [the] "aesthetic" interest. In other words, without the aesthetic nuisance,
there would be no market devaluation.
Micheliman, Toward a PracticalStandardfor Aesthetic Regulation, 15-2 PRAc. LAw. 36, 37
(1969).
47. See Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 219-23. The courts in many recent cases that
have held aesthetics alone to be a valid basis for regulation have been somewhat scornful of
the opinions buttressed by nonaesthetic grounds:
An analysis of the foregoing cases indicates that aesthetic zoning has been given judicial approbation only when clothed with other legal raiment which masked its true
purpose.... This court today holds that it is now appropriate to permit a municipality, under proper safeguard, to legally deal with the problem without subterfuge.
Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 539, 324 A.2d 113, 119
(1974). See also State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 36, 429 P.2d 825, 827 (1967);
John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Ad. Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 216-17, 339 N.E.2d 709, 716
(1975).
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more traditional purposes of the challenged regulation. How the
manner in which courts apply the standard affects whether it finds
a regulation valid is better seen by considering two hypothetical,
but typical, rationales that might be contained in recent aesthetic
regulation decisions. The first rationale is that although no health,
safety, or morals grounds exist and aesthetics alone is insufficient,
the regulation protects certain social goods, such as property values, and therefore promotes the general welfare. The second rationale relies on health or safety grounds rather than an economic general welfare justification.
The initial rationale contains at least two major flaws. First,
the protection of property values is a purely derivative effect of the
primary aesthetic impact of the regulation; as Michelman states, it
is "derivative or symptomatic-not primary or of the essence."' 4
This derivative nature is seen more clearly if compared to the
health and safety effects of regulations that are not primarily aesthetic. For instance, basic zoning regulations such as setbacks,
minimum lot size and floor area requirements, and maximum
building height restrictions are clearly aesthetic regulations to a
degree; yet there is no question that such regulations usually serve
substantial health and safety purposes, for example, by controlling
population density.49 The health and safety effects of setback and
minimum lot size regulations, however, are not derived from the
aesthetic impact of such regulations. Whereas property values are
protected only because a primarily aesthetic regulation beautifies,
fire prevention is facilitated and traffic congestion is alleviated by
density controls regardless of whether the controls also have a
beautifying effect. In those cases in which the economic impact is
entirely dependent on the aesthetic effect, it is that effect on aesthetics that must be the primary goal of the regulation. Hence,
even in a case in which some fairly substantial general welfare benefit, such as economic growth, can be shown to result from an aesthetic regulation, it is misleading and erroneous to classify the reg48. Michelman, supra note 46.
49. Some restrictions of these types, however, clearly go "beyond the arguable range of
health [and safety] demands." 1 R. ANDmRSON, supra note 15, § 7.04, at 544.
A health purpose undoubtedly justifies the imposition of reasonable density regulations, including minimum yard requirements which insure that some space will remain

between buildings to admit light and air. Less clearly related to health are extravagant
yard and setback restrictions, extremely large lot size requirements, [and] stringent
floor size regulations ....

Id. at 543-44. Those density regulations that are clearly related to health and safety are the
subject of the present discussion.
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ulation as based primarily or solely on the "nonaesthetic"
consideration.
The fact that in many cases an economic impact cannot be
shown points up the second fault of those cases in which the courts
rely on a "property values" rationale: usually, no convincing, objective evidence of an economic impact is presented,5 0 and such evidence often might not be available if sought.5 1 The possible evidence on behalf of the landowner is likely to be as speculative and
inconclusive as any that might be obtained on behalf of the government.5 2 Because the presumption of constitutionality casts the
burden of proof on the landowner, the regulation will be upheld
unless he can prove that the .question of economic impact is not
even "fairly debatable.""3 This focus on economic impact misdirects the constitutional inquiry, however, because even if the asserted economic impact exists, it is not the primary purpose of the
50. See text accompanying notes 112-29, 134-37, infra.
51. See text accompanying notes 98-109, infra.
52. Admittedly, in most of the cases discussed in this Article the landowner contesting
an aesthetic regulation failed to present evidence tending to show that the regulation did
not achieve the alleged "nonaesthetic" objective. It is doubtful, however, whether such evidence as the landowner might have obtained would have been sufficient to have rebutted
the presumption of constitutionality, particularly in those jurisdictions that require a very
high degree of proof to overcome the presumption. But cf. Naegele Outdoor Ad. Co., v.
Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968); City of Euclid v. Fitzthum,
48 Ohio App. 2d 297, 357 N.E.2d 402 (1976) (landowners in each case successfully proved
failure of ordinances to achieve alleged safety objectives).
53. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926): "If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to controL" The "fairly debatable" test is the one most frequently applied to describe the degree of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of
validity, but the necessary proof has also been described as clear and convincing evidence,
clear and affirmative evidence, a preponderance of the evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, §§ 3.16, 3.20-3.22.
The presumption of constitutionality is used by the courts not only to uphold primarily
aesthetic regulation, but also in many cases to uphold regulations that serve purposes not
primarily aesthetic, such as the density controls mentioned in the text accompanying note
49, supra. This Article criticizes the presumption of constitutionality as it is applied in
those cases involving primarily aesthetic regulation, as determined by the blind man test,
see text accompanying notes 10-13, supra. The application of the presumption in such cases
leads to unjustifiable results in jurisdictions whose rule is that regulations may not be based
solely or primarily on aesthetics, and also in jurisdictions that accept the premise that aesthetics alone may justify regulation, if the presumption is used to prevent careful assessment of the significance of that governmental interest. The broader question of whether the
presumption of constitutionality may lead to unjustifiable results in cases involving any regulation, whether primarily aesthetic or not, is beyond the scope of this Article. See 59 Nw.
U.L. Rav. 345 (1964). See also Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End:
Suggestions for Legislative and Judicial Responses, 32 ME.L. Rzv. 29, 73-77 (1980), criticizing application of the presumption of constitutionality in exclusionary zoning cases.
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regulation.
The second hypothetical rationale for upholding primarily aesthetic regulation emphasizes health or safety rather than economic
general welfare considerations: the regulation under review cannot
be justified on the basis of aesthetics alone, but since it is "fairly
debatable" that a health or safety objective is achieved in addition
to the aesthetic objective, the regulation is upheld. Again, the presumption of constitutionality may make it impossible for the landowner to prove that the regulation is based solely or primarily on
aesthetics, even though he may gather a much greater quantity of
speculative evidence in support of his contention than the government. As a result, the constitutional inquiries of permissible purpose and reasonableness are again focused upon some tangential
and perhaps nonexistent justification-here health or safetyrather than aesthetics.
Although discussion of these hypothetical rationales points up
the difficulties with relying on a purported traditional police power
purpose to uphold an aesthetic regulation, it does not, without
more, disprove the first alternative theory; i.e., it is never necessary
for a court to decide an aesthetic regulation case on the basis of
aesthetics alone. Given the manner in which recent decisions have
applied the presumption of constitutionality, a bare assertion by
the government that a primarily aesthetic regulation also has a desirable economic, health, or safety effect is sufficient to validate it,
even though that assertion may be unsupported by evidence."
This situation may be the result of a policy decision by the courts
about aesthetic regulations, but the desirability of such a result is
questionable. Some perspective on the relative merits of the ways
of treating this issue may be gained by examining several of the
key pre- and post-Berman aesthetic regulation decisions. It is also
useful to examine the way in which the Berman-inspiredexpansive
definition of general welfare has affected the direction of the inquiry and outcome of these cases.
B. Pre-Berman Cases
Perhaps the best example of what has been characterized as
the "legal fiction '5 5 of upholding aesthetic regulations by relying
on tenuous health, safety, or morals grounds is afforded by the
54. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 112-33 infra.
55. John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Ad. Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 217, 339 N.E.2d
709, 716 (1975).
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early billboard regulation cases. In St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co. v. St. Louis,56 one of the most cited cases of this genre, the

Missouri Supreme Court, while stating that "[p]roperty rights
should never be subjected to such fickle standards of regulation" 5
as aesthetics, upheld an ordinance regulating the size and location
of billboards. The court relied upon the more traditional police
power objectives to make its decision. The court found that
billboards
endanger the public health, promote immorality, [and] constitute hiding
places and retreats for criminals and all classes of miscreants. They are also
inartistic and unsightly. In cases of fire they also cause their spread and constitute barriers against their extinction; and in cases of high wind, their temporary character, frail structure and broad surface, render them liable to be
blown down ....
[T]he ground in the rear thereof is constantly used as
privies and dumping ground for all kinds of waste and deleterious matters
...behind these obstructions the lowest form of prostitution and other acts
of immorality are frequently carried on, almost under public gaze; they offer
shelter and concealment for the criminal while lying in wait for his victim;
and last, but not least, they obstruct the light, sunshine and air, which are so
conducive to health and comfort."

The court's justification of billboard regulations as protecting
health, safety, and morals often has been criticized on the ground
that billboards, if properly constructed, simply do not have the undesirable effects described in St. Louis Gunning.' Billboards, however, usually are considered "inartistic and unsightly," 0 a fact that
suggests that billboard regulation is really designed to achieve aesthetic goals. The rationale of St. Louis Gunning and the cases
which followed it61 was especially remarkable in light of the many
earlier billboard cases that had found such regulation to be based
solely or primarily on aesthetics and therefore invalid. 2 One court
56. 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 231 U.S. 761
(1913).
57. Id. at 203, 137 S.W. at 962.
58. Id. at 145, 137 S.W. at 942.
59. See General Outdoor Ad. Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 170-71,
193 N.E. 799, 809 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936) (a special master, after
hearing voluminous evidence, was persuaded that the dangers enumerated in St. Louis Gunning were confined to "some isolated cases.").
60. St. Louis Gunning Ad. Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 145, 137 S.W. 929, 942 (1911).
See Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 220: "It seems plain that the primary offense of billboards is ugliness. Any jerry-built billboard may of course be a menace to safety and a fire
hazard, but the billboard regulations are not limited to keeping the signboard screws tight."
61. See, e.g., Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944);
Kansas City Gunning Ad. Co. v. Kansas City, 240 Mo. 659, 144 S.W. 1099 (1912); People v.
Wolf, 220 A.D. 71, 220 N.Y.S. 656 (1927), appeal dismissed, 247 N.Y. 189 (1928).
62. E.g., Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909), overruled, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980)
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described the phenomenon as follows:
[The courts, somewhat sophistically ... with many protestations against
the use of aesthetic standards, urged with rather fantastic reasoning that
what previously had no relationship to public safety had now developed into
a public menace which an enlightened community not only had a right to
regulate but, indeed, would be almost wayward in failing to control.63

Nonetheless, even the United States Supreme Court employed the
St. Louis Gunning technique in upholding billboard regulation."
Other types of regulations were upheld during this era on
health, safety, and morals grounds, providing a subterfuge comparable to that employed in St. Louis Gunning. Ordinances prohibiting overhanging signs in fashionable shopping areas were sustained
on somewhat questionable health and safety grounds,"5 although
"[t]he city officials were pretty clearly not much concerned about
safety, for if signs hanging from the best stores in town are really
unsafe, reason demands that shabby ones hanging from stores in a
low-price district also be prohibited." 6
The health, safety, and morals justifications relied upon in the
above billboard and overhanging sign cases were clearly either tenuous or nonexistent and at best patently subordinate to the aesthetic reasons for the regulations. This rather crude method of upholding primarily aesthetic regulation continues to be utilized in
modern cases,6 7 but is not so widely employed today as the more
subtle technique of defining the general welfare in such a way that
a derivative benefit of aesthetics, such as protecting property values or promoting tourism, can be relied upon.68
Despite this aversion to aesthetic regulation, some preBerman courts did recognize that aesthetics was legitimately part
of the general welfare and thus could serve as a basis for land use
restrictions. As early as 1923 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
stated that aesthetic considerations are clearly a matter of general
(U.S. appeal pending); City of Chicago v. Gunning Sys., 214 IML 628, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905);
City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Ad. & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267

(1905).
63. Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 12 Conn. Supp. 272, 275 (1943), rev'd and
remanded, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944).
64. Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529 (1917).
65. 1426 Woodward Ave. Corp. v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 352, 20 N.W.2d 217 (1945); Oscar
P. Gustafson Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 231 Minn. 271, 42 N.W.2d 809 (1950). In Woodward it was conceded that the main, but not the sole, purpose of the ordinance was aesthetic. 312 Mich. at 364, 20 N.W.2d at 221.
66. Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 223.
67. See text accompanying notes 154-72, infra.
68. See text accompanying notes 93-153, infra.
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welfare, inasmuch as they contribute to the happiness of residents
and the protection of property values.6 9 The same court later recognized general welfare as an independent and sufficient justification for the exercise of the police power in cases arising under the
Vieux Carr6 Ordinance of New Orleans, which was enacted for the
purpose of preserving the character of the French Quarter. 70 In
City of New Orleans v. Levy, 71 the court stated that while aesthetic considerations alone perhaps would not justify the ordinance, the ordinance served to preserve the French Quarter "not
only for its sentimental value but also for its commercial
value," 72 -that is, it promoted tourism and thus was valid. While
the Louisiana cases and other historic preservation cases73 illustrate a broadened interpretation of the general welfare term and
generally a reliance on it alone 4 to uphold historic preservation
regulations, it should be noted that the general welfare benefits of
such regulations are not wholly derived from the aesthetic impact
of the regulations in the sense that the term "derived from" is used
in this Article. The aim of historic preservation is not merely to
beautify, to protect property values or to promote tourism, but to
preserve the unique character of areas or individual landmarks
that are a part of our nation's cultural and historical heritage in
order to orient" and educate present and future generations. 6 The
69. State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 284, 97 So. 440, 444
(1923). At issue was an ordinance prohibiting business establishments in residential districts, which the court recognized as sustainable on traditional health and safety grounds.
70. See LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 22A, which authorized the city to enact such an
ordinance.
71. 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953).
72. Id. at 29, 64 So. 2d at 803. See also Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976) (a federal post-Bernan case in which the
constitutionality of the ordinance was again upheld); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198
La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559
(1941).
73. E.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (Grand
Central Terminal); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 563
(1955) (Beacon Hill District of Boston); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass.
773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955) (Nantucket Island); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73
N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964) (historic district of Santa Fe).
74. For example, although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts realized that
the laws enacted to preserve the historic character of Nantucket Island could "hardly be
said in any ordinary sense to relate to the public safety, health, or morals," Opinion of the
Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 778, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1955), the court approved
the ordinance on general welfare grounds.
75. See The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1970).
"Congress finds and declares ... that the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation
should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development in order to give
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orienting and educating effects of historic preservation regulations
are independent of any aesthetic impact the regulation might
have-that is, such regulations serve to orient and educate regardless of whether the regulations in fact have a beautifying effect.
The historic preservation cases were not the only pre-Berman
decisions relying on the general welfare to uphold land use restrictions. None of the courts, however, went so far during that era as
to recognize aesthetics alone as a valid basis for regulation. In
State ex rel. Carter v. Harper7 7 for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that general welfare, as a justification for
restricting the use of property, was "perhaps not so well understood" as health, safety, and morals justifications. The court upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinance on the general welfare
grounds that it promoted the comfort and happiness of residents
and stabilized property values, stating that such benefits "are material rather than aesthetic in their nature." 8 Harper was quoted
at length by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in upholding an ordinance that forbade business activity in a residential district.7 '
The Texas court recognized that the preservation of property values promoted the general welfare" and that general welfare considerations were sufficient to support a regulation independently of
any health, safety, or morals justification. 81 Nevertheless, it listed
the prevention of street congestion and overcrowding when summarizing the purposes of the regulation. 8 '
The protection of the tourist industry and the economic benefits derived therefrom was held to be a proper justification for primarily aesthetic regulation in other pre-Berman cases.$$ An ordinance excluding businesses from a certain area of Miami Beach
was held valid in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co.," in
which the court stated that only the general welfare, and not
a sense of orientation to the American people." Id. at § 470(b).
76. For a discussion of the educational and "legibility" interests protected by historic
preservation regulation, and the manner in which those interests are unrelated to aesthetic
concerns, see Williams, supra note 37, at 34-36.
77. 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
78. Id. at 159, 196 N.W. at 455.
79. Connor v. City of Univ. Park, 142 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
80. Id. at 712.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 713.
83. Although tourism is often cited as a factor in the historic preservation cases, see
text accompanying notes 70-76, supra, historic preservation regulation is not primarily aesthetic regulation. See note 149, infra.
84. 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941).
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health, safety, or morals, could be the basis for that particular ordinance. 5 The Florida court found the general welfare purpose of
the ordinance to be primarily that of promoting tourism, and in its
opinion recognized tourism as derived from the promotion of aesthetics. The court, however, did not go so far as to hold that aesthetics alone could be a valid basis for such regulation: "It is difficult to see how the success of Miami Beach could continue if its
aesthetic appeal were ignored because the beauty of the community is a distinct lure to the winter traveler."86 In a later decision
the Florida court stated that aesthetic considerations alone were
sufficient to justify a land use restriction87 and relied on City of
Miami Beach as supporting this proposition. As the preceding discussion indicates, however, City of Miami Beach did not go that
far.88
The pre-Berman cases, in summary, illustrate both of the
camouflaging techniques for upholding primarily aesthetic regulation on "nonaesthetic" grounds: (1) by relying on an economic or
other general welfare impact of a regulation that is purely derived
from the aesthetic impact, as in the Florida tourism cases; and (2)
by relying on tenuous or nonexistent health and safety grounds, as
in the early billboard regulation cases. While the latter technique
is probably less popular today than in earlier times, the former
technique of relying on one or more of the myriad elements of the
expansive post-Berman concept of general welfare has been refined
to an art.
C. Post-Berman Cases
In the quarter century since the Supreme Court declared that
the public welfare may be promoted by legislation designed to
make a community "beautiful as well as healthy,"8 ' aesthetic regulations have enjoyed a more favorable reception in the courts. Although there has been no wholesale adoption of the proposition
85.

Id. at 485-86, 3 So. 2d at 366. Only hotels and apartments were permitted in the

restricted area.
86. Id. at 487, 3 So. 2d at 367.
87.

Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla.1953).

88. For a critical analysis of these and other Florida cases, see 18 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 430,
supra note 32, at 435-39. The author urged recognition of aesthetics alone as a sufficient
basis for regulation: "[Such a position] removes the stress on the economic aspects of a
pleasant community, and it admits that residents have as much right to pleasant surroundings as do tourists." Id. at 439.
89. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
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that aesthetics alone may be a valid basis for regulation," the general welfare justification for police power regulation-which in
many of the early zoning cases seemed to have little or no significance apart from the traditional health, safety, and morals
grounds-has unmistakably come into its own.' 1 Courts are more
frequently relying on the "broad and inclusive'

2

nature of the

general welfare in upholding restrictions on the use of property
that cannot reasonably be based on the promotion of health,
safety, or morals. Courts are also beginning to accept the view that
the protection of beauty is an important part of the general welfare. The majority of these courts, however, emphasize that aesthetics is only one element of the general welfare, and in upholding
primarily aesthetic regulation, they stress the economic benefits
that will result from the regulation.
1. The Protection of Property Values
Protection of property values has become the favorite
"nonaesthetic" general welfare justification of the post-Berman
courts. If the court can discern a property values objective in the
challenged restriction, then it can uphold what might otherwise be
an invalid regulation; and it can do so without relying solely on the
still questionable "aesthetics alone" rationale. The notion, however, that a regulation that tends to protect property values can be
upheld on that ground, even though not solely on aesthetic
grounds, has not been accepted by all courts.'0 Those decisions
that find both economic and aesthetic grounds insufficient are in
fact logically consistent, since the newly discovered and much relied-on property values justification is merely derived from that
old pariah, aesthetics." While most courts have not acknowledged
90.

See note 16, supra, and accompanying text.

91. Anderson notes that litigation involving minimum lot area requirements "produced the first consistent and articulate exposition by numerous and widely scattered courts
of the view that the term 'welfare' included the community's interest in the effect of appear-

ance upon the value of the property." 1 R. ANDEMsoN, supra note 15, § 7.20, at 574 (citation
omitted).
92.

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).

93. See, e.g., Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1943).
94. The status of the preservation of property values as a police power objective was
questioned in 59 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 372, 390 (1964):

[T]he preservation of property values does not fit so comfortably as might be desired
into the traditional formulation of the police power. Property values would have to fall
both precipitously and widely in order seriously to threaten health, safety and morals.
If the preservation of values is an aspect of the protection of welfare, it needs to be
balanced, at least, against other interests which fall under the welfare heading.
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that protection of property values is purely derived from aesthetic
objectives, the relationship between property values and aesthetics
has been recognized by commentators who have suggested that
property values can be used as an objective gauge in assessing the
reasonableness of necessarily subjective aesthetic judgments that
restrict the use of property." In most cases it is probably true that
aesthetic considerations and economics are "inextricably intertwined."9 6 Nevertheless, upholding the validity of a primarily aesthetic regulation on the ground that it will tend to protect property values, while asserting that aesthetics alone is an insufficient
ground, is misleading. Property values will clearly not be enhanced
by a regulation with no basis in health, safety, or morals unless
beauty, as perceived by prospective purchasers, is enhanced by the
regulation.
On the other hand, it is arguable that to protect property vala
ues regulation need not necessarily promote aesthetics, but need
merely forbid the introduction of property uses that do not conform to existing uses. By this reasoning, property values are preserved by forbidding uses that are different, but not necessarily
ugly; hence the subjective aesthetic judgment is avoided. One court
has stated that a zoning ordinance prohibiting mobile homes in a
residential area protects property values in this manner:
Quite apart from whether mobile homes are less beautiful or more attractive
than conventional dwellings, they do not look like conventional homes. This
See also R. BABCOCK, THn ZONING GAMs 119-20 (1966); Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. Rzv. 179, 191 n.64 (1975), noting that of the
many factors that may affect property values-including, for example, the movement of persons of a different race or religion into a neighborhood-very few factors are now considered
properly subject to zoning control. If the property values justification permits control of one
factor, such as aesthetics, why does it not permit control of all factors that may affect prop-

erty values?
95. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 46, at 37; Turnbull, Aesthetic Zoning, 7 WAxz
FoREST L. Rzv. 230, 242-53 (1971); 8 IND. L. Rzv. 1028, supranote 42, at 1039. This sugges-

tion is consistent with the position of this Article that the economic impact of a regulation is
derivative from its aesthetic impact. Moreover, the suggestion that an aesthetic regulation
should be held valid only if there is evidence of its beneficial economic impact is entirely
appropriate in those jurisdictions that adhere to the majority rule that aesthetics alone may
not justify regulation. The approach of Micheman and Turnbull, however, is inappropriate
in majority-rule jurisdictions if a beneficial economic benefit is always presumed rather than
proved, and would never allow the result possible in a minority of jurisdictions that an
aesthetic regulation with no provable economic impact may be valid on the basis of aesthetics alone. It should also be noted that the rule that the economic impact of a regulation is
derivative from its aesthetic impact is not without exception. See note 210, infra, and accompanying text.
96. Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 494, 150 A.2d 481, 487
(1959).
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difference in appearance has persuaded many municipalities that mobile
homes in conventional home neighborhoods will depress property values
....

[T]he very fact of structural difference may make mobile homes an

architectual and economic depreciating factor in a conventional residential
neighborhood....9

By such an analysis, the aesthetic judgment is supposedly
avoided since the regulated land use need not be classified as
unaesthetic but merely as "different." In fact, however, the judgment that a particular use is undesirable because it is "different" is
simply another kind of aesthetic judgment-a judgment that two
uses, which might be attractive individually, are not attractive
when placed side by side. In any event, regulations justified in this
manner commonly do regulate land uses that are popularly perceived as unaesthetic, even though the courts may avoid using that
label. One would be hard put to find a regulation that protects
property values by forbidding beautiful uses in an ugly area because the beautiful use is "different." If the regulation under review were one that prohibited a conventional single-family residence in a mobile home area, rather than a regulation that
prohibited a mobile home in a conventional housing area, it would
seem exceedingly difficult to find that the regulation protected
property values by prohibiting the "different" use.
Whether a regulation is said to protect property values because it prohibits unaesthetic uses or because it merely prohibits
"different" uses, a major shortcoming of the cases that uphold regulations on these grounds is that usually little, if any, objective evidence exists of the regulation's impact on property values, on
which the courts purport to rely so heavily. This lack of evidence is
attributable to two factors: the presumption of constitutionality,
and the difficulty of obtaining objective evidence on such speculative matters. The interaction of these two factors causes the landowner's burden of proof to be nearly insurmountable. The presumption of constitutionality places the burden of proof on the
landowner, who must present proof sufficient to place the matter
beyond the realm of fair debate in order to overcome the presumption. The unavailability of convincing, objective evidence on the
speculative property values issue, however, is as much an obstacle
to the landowner as it is to the government. The result is that usually the only evidence on the property values issue recited in the
opinions, if any at all is recited, is the testimony of one or two real
estate brokers or developers that, in their opinion, if the regulation
97.

Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 29, 586 P.2d 860, 867 (1978).
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were not enforced, property values would decline. The use of testimony of expert appraisers is very rare.98 In describing the quality
of the evidence relied upon to uphold one type of aesthetic regulation-architectural controls-Professor George Lefcoe observed:
"Courts that have used property values testimony in sustaining an
architectural control decision invariably rely on a sort of valuation
testimony that would be stricken as incompetent in a condemnation suit, and in most other types of lawsuits for which property
values really matter.""s
Even if the courts demanded that the government produce objective evidence from professional appraisers on this issue, it is
quite possible that such evidence would be unobtainable. Professor
Lefcoe has summarized the problem of finding an evidentiary basis
for property values in an architectural control context:
It is nearly impossible to know whether a glass house located in a neighborhood of traditional homes will actually lower values. Consider how the measurement of property values would have to be taken if real objectivity were
the goal. You locate two similar blocks of traditional houses, one with a modem house in its midst and the other without a contemporary structure. All
other variables have to be excluded. We want, after all, a measure of the
effect on neighboring values of the intrusive architectural style, and not
changes in the school systems serving the two areas, new traffic patterns, the
social class or wealth of incoming residents and the like. To the best of my
knowledge no such studies have been done. 10°

An appraiser's determination of the market value of a given piece
of property by examining the sale or rental prices of properties
substantially similar is considered the most objective evidence of
value,20 1 but this "market approach" to value is impossible, as Pro98. Even when expert appraisers give testimony on property values, their conflicting
opinions may be useless to a landowner who must rebut the presumption of constitutionality. See Eustice v. Binsford, Chancery No. 19497 (Cir. Ct. of Arlington County, Va., Sept.
24, 1969) (three conflicting opinions on effect of proposed design), discussed in Turnbull,
supra note 95, at 239-40. See also Ward v. County of Cook, 68 IMIApp. 3d 563, 386 N.E.2d
309 (1979), in which plaintiffs, who had been unsuccessful in obtaining a rezoning, challenged the validity of an ordinance placing the subject property in a more restrictive residential zone than they wished. Plaintiffs' two appraisers testified that plaintiffs' proposed
residential development would have no detrimental effect on property values; defendant's
appraiser testified that some nearby homes would suffer a depreciation in value of $10,000.
Id. at 566-67, 386 N.E.2d at 312-13. The court applied the presumption of constitutionality
and upheld the ordinance because, inter alia, it protected "the surrounding area against
depreciation or economic loss." Id. at 572, 386 N.E.2d at 316.
99. G. LaRcoE, LAND DzmvaoPmxrw LAw: CASES & MATRALxs 969-70 (2d ed. 1974).
100. Id. at 969. This material is also found in a legal analysis of architectural control
prepared by Professor Lefcoe in AMERIcAN INsTrruTE OF ARcHrrsc'rs CoMiNr
ON DESIGN,
DESIGN REVIEw BOARDS: A HANDBOOK FOR CoMMuNmITS 36 (1974).
101. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISING 8-9 (3d ed. E. Friedman 1978):
"Primary evidence of value stems from recent sales or rentals of properties substantially
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fessor Lefcoe suggests, if there are no substantially similar properties to compare to the subject property. In other words, the question whether an unaesthetic land use lowers, or would lower, the
value of surrounding properties is best answered by ascertaining
the values of properties in a substantially similar neighborhood in

which a substantially similar unaesthetic use is located

02-

presuming such a neighborhood with such a use can be found. Of
course, valuation approaches other than the "market approach"
are available to appraisers, but these approaches are generally considered less satisfactory.1 0 3 In any event, none of the possible approaches are currently employed in the aesthetic regulation cases,

since many, if not most, courts seem willing to find that property
values are protected by such regulations even without a trace of
evidence to that effect.' 0"
Professor Stephen F. Williams has suggested that the difficulty of correlating property values with aesthetic considerations is
due to the extremely polycentric nature of the aesthetic judgment.1 05 The polycentricity problem arises
when three factors coincide: (1) a multiplicity of possible solutions; (2) an
interdependency of relevant factors so that the outcome as to one feature of
similar to the subject property. This is the most convincing type of evidence in an appraisal
and is accorded the greatest weight in arriving at a final value estimate."
102. The lack of such evidence in Berg Agency v. Township of Maplewood, 163 N.J.
Super. 542, 395 A.2d 261 (1978), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 189-95, caused
the court to dismiss the governments' argument that the sign ordinances in question protected property values, even though the governments had presented opinion evidence on the
issue.
Although the real estate brokers, called as [the governments'] expert witnesses, were of
the opinion that such signs were aesthetically displeasing and would, therefore, have a
detrimental effect on property values, no objective evidence was submitted to corroborate such opinions, as, for example, the instability of property values in other communities that do not have restrictive sign ordinances.
Id. at 557, 395 A.2d at 269.
103. Other approaches include the "income approach" and the "cost approach,"
neither of which is considered as reliable as the market approach. See generally ENCYCLOPEDop REAL ESTATE APPRAISING, supra note 101, at 9-14.
104. In those situations in which the market data necessary for the most effective employment of any of the three approaches to finding market value is unavailable, the appraiser can at least employ "rationalization." "Rationalization" is
the mental processes required in relating less pertinent market data to the problem at
hand, data which leads to a reasonable or logically supportable conclusion more indirectly than transactions involving highly comparable properties .... If data available
in the market is inconclusive or nonexistent, a studied rationalization of the problem
would seem to be better than no rationalization at all, certainly better than pulling a
figure out of the air.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REAL ESTATE APPRImSING, supra note 101, at 9.
105. Williams, supra note 37, at 18-20.
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the problem will affect the outcome as to other features; and (3) a multiplicity of relevant factors that make it difficult to trace one solution's superiority
to any particular attribute or combination of attributes.'"

The combination of these factors produces two results: the reasons
for any given resolution of the polycentric problem are not amenable to articulation, and it is impossible to determine whether any
series of resolutions of polycentric problems is consistent. 107 Since
defining what is aesthetically pleasing is a polycentric problem, the
computation of the economic impact allegedly resulting from the
aesthetic judgment is also polycentric. "The polycentric character
that prevents a legislature from articulating a rule of 'beauty' will
also prevent real estate agents from articulating rules for computing an 'ugliness' discount"'108 when called upon to assess the impact
that a regulated or prohibited use would have on the property values of the regulated area.' 09
The difficulty of obtaining objective evidence of the economic
impact of aesthetic regulation is probably greatest in those cases
involving architectural design review legislation, which authorizes a
design review board to prevent construction of a building on the
basis of its proposed design." 0 Although such legislation typically
recites that one purpose of the review is to protect property values,"' the extent to which economic considerations actually enter
into the boards' decisions is debatable. Furthermore, when the decisions of the boards have been upheld by the courts, the courts
have usually purported to rely very much on economic considerations; however, the absence in the opinions of any objective valua106. Id. at 18. Professor Williams borrows the definition of polycentricity from L.
Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960 PROCEEmDINGS OF Tm AmmcAN SocmT or
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 3-4.
107. See Williams, supra note 37, at 19.
108. Id. at 20.
109. One recent study has concluded that sophisticated statistical analysis provides a
basis for estimating the value of "amenities," specifically the negative prices for aircraft
noise, road traffic, planned road widening, and railway noise, and the positive prices for a
good view, a spacious street, access to shops, and a high-quality neighborhood. The estimated values were concluded to be suitable for use in cost-benefit studies, but not necessarily reflective of average household willingness to pay prices. Abelson, Property Prices and
the Value of Amenities, 6 J. ENVT'L. ECON. & MNGusr. 11 (1979).
110. A study by the American Institute of Architects begun in 1968 counted at least
221 such boards. AmzmcAN INsTrruT oF ARcHcrscvs Commnrr ON DESIGN, supra note 100,
at 7. It is likely that the number is much larger today. See J. BauscHxR, R. WRIGr & M.
GrrzLmuA, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 863 (2d ed. 1976).
111. See, e.g., Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 68, 192 N.E.2d
74, 76 (1963) (quoting the challenged ordinance): "The purposes of the Architectural Board
of Review are ... to maintain the high character of community development, and to protect real estate ... from impairment or destruction of value. .. "
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tion evidence is striking.
The first major post-Berman aesthetic regulation case was an
architectural controls case, State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Wieland.""2 Saveland Park Holding Corporation was denied a building permit to erect a residence because it had failed to
obtain a finding by the local Building Board "that the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan of the proposed structure
[would], when erected, not be so at variance with... the structures already constructed or in the course of construction... as to
cause a substantial depreciation in the property values of said
neighborhood."' 3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the quoted
architectural design review ordinance constitutional, stating that
the protection of property values is valid even as the sole basis for
a zoning ordinance.1"' Quoting Berman, the court concluded that it
was "extremely doubtful" that the rule precluding aesthetics alone
as a valid basis of a zoning ordinance was still the law. 115 Nevertheless, the court did not clearly reject the general rule, and in fact it
discussed at length the relation of property values to general welfare. The opinion cited no evidence, however, on the question
whether the proposed structure in fact would have depressed property values.'1 6
The protection of property values was also accorded great importance in State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley,117 in which the
Missouri Supreme Court upheld the architectural design review ordinance of the City of Ladue and the Architectural Board's decision rejecting Stoyanoff's proposed home design. The proposed residence was "of a pyramid shape, with a flat top, and with
triangular shaped windows or doors at one or more corners." 11
'
Stoyanoff, an architect, had apparently designed the house and a
112. 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
113. Id. at 265, 69 N.W.2d at 219 (quoting challenged ordinance).
114. Id. at 270, 69 N.W.2d at 222.
115. Id. at 271, 69 N.W.2d at 222. This language from Wieland was referred to in
Racine County v. Plourde, 38 Wis. 2d 403, 412, 157 N.W.2d 591, 595 (1968), in which the

court, observing that the constitutionality of the ordinance involved in Racine County was
not at issue, stated: "However, we are cognizant that aesthetic considerations alone may
now be sufficient to justify a prohibited use in a zoning ordinance." Id. Thus, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has yet to rule clearly that aesthetic considerations alone are sufficient. But
see Bufford, supra note 16, at 144.
116. It should be noted, however, that apparently the only issue on appeal was the
facial constitutionality of the ordinance. 269 Wis. at 264, 69 N.W.2d at 218.
117. 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
118.

Id. at 308.
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picture of its model had appeared in an architectural magazine.1 1 '
Nevertheless, the city described the structure as "a monstrosity of
grotesque design." 120 The evidence of the proposed design's effect
on property values in the city, which was "composed principally of

residences of the general types of Colonial, French Provincial and
English Tudor,"121 consisted of the affidavits of a real estate developer and a city planning and engineering consultant that, in their
opinions, the proposed residence would have a "substantial adverse
effect" on the market values of other homes in the area.1 The
court, emphasizing the language of the ordinance relating to property values, rejected Stoyanoff's contention that the ordinance was
based entirely on aesthetic factors and that the denial of the building permit was arbitrary and unreasonable.
The "aesthetics alone" challenge was dismissed in a similar
manner in Reid v. Architectural Board of Review,1 2 3 the most notorious of the architectural design review cases. Mrs. Reid was denied a permit to build what she described as "a flat-roofed complex
of twenty modules, each of which is ten feet high, twelve feet
square and arranged in a loosely formed U which winds its way
through a grove of trees"12 in a neighborhood of, "in the main,

dignified, stately and conventional structures, two and one-half
stories high."1 5 The ordinance stated that one of the purposes of
architectural review was to protect property values. The court,
stating inter alia that the proposed structure "does not preserve
property values, ' ' 26 concluded that there were many factors other
than aesthetics that influenced the Board's decision.1 $7 The only
119. See Mandelker, Stoyanoff: Back to the Barricades!, 22 ZONING DIG. 288a, 288b
n.4 (1970). "[S]ome would argue that it was the surrounding area that was grotesque, and
not the Stoyanoff's [sic] proposed home." Id. at 288b.
120. 458 S.W.2d at 307.
121. Id. at 309.
122. Id. at 307-08.
123. 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963).
124. Id. at 70, 192 N.E.2d at 77.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 71, 192 N.E.2d at 78.
127. The court listed the influencing factors as follows:
The structure designed is a single-story home in a multi-story neighborhood; it does
not conform to the general character of other houses; it would affect adjacent homes
and three vacant lots; it is of such a radical concept that any design not conforming to
the general character of the neighborhood would have to be thereafter approved; when
viewed from the street, it could indicate a commercial building, it does not conform to
[the] standards of the neighborhood; it does not preserve [the] high character of [the]
neighborhood; it does not preserve property values; it would be detrimental to [the]
neighborhood on the lot where proposed; and it would be detrimental to the future
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reference to any evidence on property values came in the dissenting opinion, in which the testimony of a Board member was
quoted:
Q. Now the Board never took the position that this house would hurt property values along North Park Boulevard, did it?
A. Our issue was the fact that it was a single story house in a multi-story
neighborhood....
Q. In other words, you were concerned ....
A. . .. and it did not conform to the aesthetics of the neighborhood.
Q. Your objection was grounded upon the appearance of this house and not
upon any market value depreciation possibility?
A. There is no question that the house would be in a class cost-wise with
those in the neighborhood .... L28

In his dissent, Judge Corrigan asserted that the record "conclusively established" 12 ' that the decision of the Board was based on
aesthetic considerations alone and therefore should be overturned.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to know whether the pyramidshaped house proposed by Stoyanoff and the modular home proposed by Mrs. Reid, if built, actually would have depressed the
market value of other homes in their respective areas. Certainly
the evidence of the homes' probable effects on property values, at
least as reviewed in the opinions, was less than convincing. As previously discussed,13 0 perhaps it would have been impossible to obtain objective evidence of the detrimental impact on property values in these cases. Moreover, even if the best available opinion
evidence were obtained, the contradictory testimony of three appraisers in one unreported architectural review case-that the proposed structure would harm property values, that the structure
would enhance property values, and that it would not harm property values 1 31-suggests that any proposed structure could "produce such a range of opinions if the litigants were willing to look
development of the neighborhood.

Id. at 71, 192 N.E.2d at 77-78. It is submitted that each of these factors is based on either
aesthetics or economics, and that the economic impact, if any, is purely derivative from the

aesthetic impact.
128. Id. at 73, 192 N.E.2d at 79 (Corrigan, J., dissenting). One writer has suggested
that "[f]rom the portions of the trial court record quoted in the dissent of Judge Corrigan, it
appears that the possibility of a negative effect on neighboring property values might well
have been considered only to find that it was nonexistent." Williams, supra note 37, at 30
n.105.
129. 119 Ohio App. at 73, 192 N.E.2d at 78 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
130. See text at notes 99-109, supra.
131. Turnbull, supra note 95, at 239-40, citing the unreported opinion of Eustice v.
Binsford, Chancery No. 19497 (Cir. Ct. of Arlington County, Va., Sept. 24, 1969).
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hard enough for witnesses.

' 13 2

Even though both the government

and the contesting landowner may face the problem of an absence
of objective evidence, it is the landowner who has the burden of
proof. Thus, the landowner almost invariably will lose out, and the
court invariably will be able to reaffirm its position that a regulation may not be based on aesthetic objectives alone. The rub is
that no one really knows whether there was something other than
aesthetics involved. 133
The protection of property values has been asserted as a justification for upholding many other types of aesthetic regulation in
the post-Berman years, including requirements that recreational
vehicles be housed in garages, 1" requirements that junkyards be
fenced,13 5 prohibitions of billboards from residential districts,'"
and city-wide prohibitions of billboards. 3 ' Even though the impact
132. Williams, supra note 37, at 20 n.62.
133. Even if the regulations could be shown to have an economic impact, it should be
recognized that the protection of property values is a derivative and possibly incidental goal.
See Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975), in which an architectural control ordinance was held invalid because not authorized by the state enabling statutes. In Rowe the court stated in dictaSome jurisdictions have adopted the rule upholding architectural design regulations
when it appears that the purpose of the ordinance was to protect property values
within the zone.... We decline to follow this rule when, as here, it appears that the
predominant purpose of the ordinance was to promote aesthetic values and the purpose
recited in the ordinance to protect property values was merely an incidental goal.
Id. at 146, 216 S.E.2d at 213.
134. See, e.g., Township of Livingston v. Marchev, 85 N.J. Super. 428, 205 A.2d 65
(1964), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 201 (1965) (opinion recited no evidence on property values issue; presumption of constitutionality applied); City of Pepper Pike v. Landskroner, 53
Ohio App. 2d 63, 371 N.E.2d 579 (1977). Cases in which the validity of such ordinances was
discussed are collected at Annot., 95 A.L.R.3d 378 (1979). In Landskroner,the court did not
rely on the protection of property values per se, but held that the ordinance promoted the
general welfare by "preserving and protecting the orderly development, the character and
the integrity of a single-family neighborhood." City of Pepper Pike v. Landskroner, 53 Ohio
App. at 75, 371 N.E.2d at 586. How the banning of recreational vehicles in order to preserve
the character and integrity of a neighborhood differs from banning recreational vehicles for
aesthetic reasons was not elucidated. For a collection of other cases approving the preservation of the character of an area as a proper object of police power regulation, see 8 IND. L.
Rzv. 1028, supra note 42, at 1035-36.
135. E.g., Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960) (opinion recited no
evidence on property values issue; presumption of constitutionality applied; regulation upheld also for health, safety, and aesthetic reasons).
136. Naegele Outdoor Ad. Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d
206 (1968). In Naegele, the court found "clear evidence in the record that exclusively residential zoning enhances property values." Id. at 499, 162 N.W.2d at 212.
137. E.g., United Ad. Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964).
The court emphasized protection of property values even though the parties had stipulated
that there would be no decrease in property values. Id. at 10, 198 A.2d at 451-52 (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
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on property values in such cases is derivative, and usually is presumed rather than proven, there is an important difference between these and the architectural design review cases. Certain land
uses may be so discordant in particular settings that their unaesthetic nature, at least as such is popularly perceived, is nearly indisputable-for example, billboards and junkyards in or near residential areas. Mrs. Reid's or Mr. Stoyanoff's disapproved house
designs, however, very probably would not be condemned as ugly
with nearly the degree of unanimity with which a junkyard would
be condemned. The significance of the aesthetic interest of the
community varies from case to case, and it is unrealistic to classify
both junkyards and modernistic homes as unaesthetic without recognizing the obvious difference in the degree to which the respective uses are unaesthetic. Michelman deplored the enforcement of
aesthetic regulation without compensation in those cases in which
"the question of aesthetic improvement is ... unobvious, debatable, and apparently idiosyncratic, so that the grudging acknowledgment of social desirability that might otherwise assuage the sense
of injustice is likely to be absent."1 3 8 The present rule in Ohio recognizes and addresses the problem identified by Michelman by
permitting regulation based on aesthetics alone only as to property
uses that "would be in such gross contrast to the surrounding area
as to be patently offensive to the surrounding neighborhood, rather
than merely a matter of taste."18 9
Just as the significance of a community's aesthetic interest
may vary according to the kind of land use regulated, so should the
significance of the economic impact of different uses vary. If a regulated use is so aesthetically displeasing that virtually everyone
would agree that it is undesirable, presumably a definite correlation between such a use and a depreciation of property values
would exist. Billboards were described as having such an economic
140
effect in United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen:
There are areas in which aesthetics and economics coalesce, areas in which a

discordant sight is as hard an economic fact as an annoying odor or sound.
We refer not to some sensitive or exquisite preference but to concepts of con138. Michelman, supra note 46, at 42.
139. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Upper Arlington, 55 Ohio App. 2d 27, 31, 379 N.E.2d 266,
269 (1977) (sign regulation upheld). See also State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243
N.E.2d 66 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 163 (1969) (statutes requiring junkyards to be obscured from view of persons passing on highways upheld); P & S Inv. Co. v. Brown, 40 Ohio
App. 2d 535, 320 N.E.2d 675 (1974) (prohibition of trailers for storage in business district
upheld).
140. 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964).
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gruity held so widely that
they are inseparable from the enjoyment and hence
14 1
the value of property.

The danger in this position, however, is that every unaesthetic

land use could be presumed to depress property values. Courts
must be wary of taking this step. For instance, the New Jersey Superior Court has refused to indulge in such a presumption in cases

involving political signs142 and "for sale" and "sold" signs1 43 in residential areas when no objective evidence of property value depreciation is present. Because of the presumption of constitutionality,
however, most courts will presume the existence of an economic
impact even though the corresponding aesthetic impact of the regulated use may be minimal. The community interests of aesthetics
and economics should be recognized as varying in significance according to the type of land use regulated. As the aesthetic interest
becomes less clear and significant, the presumption that an economic impact exists becomes more questionable.
2. The Promotion of Tourism
Many post-Berman decisions upholding primarily aesthetic
regulations have done so by finding an economic benefit of the regulation other than the preservation of property values-namely the

promotion of tourism. Most of the decisions relying on the tourism
rationale have involved the prohibition or regulation of outdoor
advertising signs. 44 Interestingly, such regulations are the kind
most often upheld in recent cases on the basis of aesthetics
alone.145 In Florida, where promotion of the tourist industry has
141. Id. at 5, 198 A.2d at 449.
142. Farrell v. Township of Teaneck, 126 N.J. Super. 460, 462, 315 A.2d 424, 425-26
(1974): "Although it is a generally accepted fact that the value of property is unextricably
intertwined with aesthetic considerations,. . . we cannot assume that every tasteless choice
of paint color or unartistic gardening effort results in a decrease of property values."
143. Berg Agency v. Township of Maplewood, 163 N.J. Super. 542, 557-58, 395 A.2d
261, 269 (1978).
144. See, e.g., E.B. Elliott Ad. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 805 (1970); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d
848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980) (U.S. appeal pending); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n. v. Roberts Enterprises, Inc., 304 So. 2d 637 (Miss. 1974); Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961). With the exception of the Roberts Enterprises
case, the courts in each of these decisions relied partially on a finding that billboard regulation promoted traffic safety, a police power objective not derived from aesthetics.
145. E.g., John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Me. 1978); State v.
Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor
Ad. Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 324 A.2d 113 (1974); Suffolk Outdoor Ad. Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d
483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 402 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 808 (1978); Sun
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long been accorded importance in aesthetic regulation cases, 1"6
tourism has been mentioned in upholding a requirement that junkyards be screened,147 and by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
approving prior Florida cases, in upholding regulation of the location of gasoline stations. 8
Since logically tourism is promoted by a regulation only because the regulation fosters beauty, it is apparent that this economic general welfare justification is as much derived from aesthetics as is the property values justification. If the supposedly
tourism-promoting regulation cannot reasonably be said to be
based on health, safety, or morals, then the real issue in these cases
is whether aesthetics alone is a proper basis for regulation-an issue that the courts contend is not present.1 4" Not only is the general welfare benefit of tourism derived from aesthetics, but, again,
there is often little or no objective evidence showing that the regulatory measure in fact tends to promote the economic objective.
Instead, the courts indulge in syllogistic reasoning that could no
doubt be repeated convincingly by almost any court in any jurisdiction in the United States: the tourist industry is important to
this area; tourists come to enjoy our visually pleasing environment;
this regulation enhances that environment; therefore it promotes
tourism.1 50
Oil Co. v. City of Upper Arlington, 55 Ohio App. 2d 27, 379 N.E.2d 266 (1977) (aesthetic
regulation valid when regulated use is in "gross contrast" to permitted uses and is "patently
offensive").
146. See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
147. Rotenberg v. City of Fort Pierce, 202 So. 2d 782, 785-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
148. Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1971).
149. This analysis does not necessarily apply, however, to those regulations that promote tourism by preserving the character of a historically significant area. See, e.g., Maher
v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) (French Quarter); Donnelly Ad. Corp.
v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md. 660, 370 A.2d 1127 (1977) (Baltimore's Oldtown). Tourists
would presumably visit historical areas whether those areas are beautiful or not; the educational and orienting benefits of preserving historical areas exist because the areas are historical, regardless of whether they are visually pleasing. Hence the general welfare benefits of
historic preservation regulations, which may include the economic benefits of promoting
tourism or protecting property values, are not wholly derived from the aesthetic impact of
such regulations. See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
150. Finding constitutional state-wide restrictions on outdoor advertising, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court stated:
New Hampshire is peculiarly dependent upon its scenic beauty to attract the hosts of
tourists, the income from whose presence is a vital factor in our economy. That the
general welfare of the State is enhanced when tourist business is good and affected
adversely when it is bad, is obvious. It may thus be found that whatever tends to promote the attractiveness of roadside scenery for visitors relates to "the benefit and wel-
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The significance of the community interests in aesthetics and

in promoting the tourist industry will of course vary from case to
case. For instance, in regard to the regulation of billboard advertis-

ing particularly, the community interest in aesthetics is much
greater when at issue is the regulation of billboards in residential
areas as opposed to industrial areas.151 Similarly, the governmental
interest in tourism is surely insignificant to the extent that the reg-

ulation of billboards extends to areas of the city or state that are
not regularly visited by tourists. Nevertheless, both city-wide1 52
and state-wide1 53 billboard regulations have been upheld on the
ground that they promote the general welfare by protecting the
tourist industry. The presumption of constitutionality protects this

derivative and incidental justification from close scrutiny.
3. The Protection of Health and Safety
Even though courts in the post-Berman era have with increasing frequency relied upon the promotion of the general welfare-usually meaning the protection of a community's economic
interests-to uphold restrictions on the use of land, the more
traditional police power objectives of health and safety have also
been cited to support many types of regulation. These regulations
have included restrictions on chain link fences," junkyards, 15 5
fare of this state" and may be held subject to the police power.
Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 270, 169 A.2d 762, 764 (1961).
151. See Lucking, The Regulation of OutdoorAdvertising: Past, Present and Future,
6 ENvr'L AFF. 179 (1977). Lucking argues that the community interest in aesthetics should
not outweigh the economic interests at stake where advertising signs in commercial areas
are concerned; he criticizes John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Ad. Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 339
N.E.2d 709 (1975), in which the court upheld a city-wide prohibition of billboards on the
basis of aesthetics alone. Lucking, supra, at 184-89.
152. E.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 510 (1980) (U.S. appeal pending).
153. E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961).
154. E.g., City of Smyrna v. Parks, 240 Ga. 699, 242 S.E.2d 73 (1978). The challenged
ordinance prohibited chain link fences in certain residential areas where only wooden fences
were allowed. Evidence adduced in the lower court included "testimony that a number of
persons had been injured on the sharp ends of chain-link fences within the city... [and]
testimony that it was easier for firefighters to gain access to burning houses through wooden
fences." Id. at 705, 242 S.E.2d at 77. The court applied the presumption of constitutionality
and held the ordinance valid. "Even if the ground of safety is deemed a tenuous one... the
ordinance would not be an unwarranted exercise of police power based on aesthetics alone,
provided there is a reasonable relationship between the regulation and the legitimate purposes of regulations, as enunciated by the legislature." Id.
155. E.g., Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960); Highway 100 Auto
Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959).
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mobile homes,1 58 recreational vehicles, 157 gasoline stations, 15 8 and
advertising signs.159 Realistically, the enactment of these regulations, in most instances, could probably be said to have been motivated primarily by the desires of legislative bodies to promote aesthetics in particular areas and to reap the economic benefits
derived from beauty. As noted by one observer, however, "upon a
finding that health, safety, or moral considerations could have justified the zoning ordinance, many courts will assume that they did
and fail to discuss further the aesthetics issue."1 6 0
Unlike the general welfare economic benefits of protection of
property values and tourism, the protection of health and safety is
not a benefit derived from aesthetics. For example, a requirement
that junkyards be fenced may protect the health and safety of children who might otherwise be tempted to enter the junkyard;116 this
objective is accomplished regardless of whether the fencing requirement tends to make the area more visually pleasing. If a regulation has as one of its purposes the protection of health and
safety, the initial constitutional inquiry of whether a permissible
police power purpose is present need not focus upon whether aesthetics alone is permissible. If, however, the rule of the jurisdiction
is that aesthetics may not be the sole or predominantpurpose of a
regulation,16 2 perhaps even the initial inquiry cannot be answered
in favor of the constitutionality of the regulation. The protection
156. E.g., State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Mo.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 851 (1971); Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959).
157. E.g., Village of Glenview v. Van Dyke, 98 M1.App. 2d 118, 240 N.E.2d 354 (1968).
158. E.g., Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971).
159. E.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 510 (1980) (U.S. appeal pending) (holding regulation reasonably related to traffic
safety; but even if principal purpose were aesthetics rather than traffic safety, such purpose
is within city's authority); Veterans of Foreign Wars v. City of Steamboat Springs, 575 P.2d
835 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978); Gosman v. Prince George's County, 41
Md. App. 479, 397 A.2d 630 (1979); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App.
47, 199 N.W.2d 525 (1972); Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117
(1969).
160. 8 IND. L. REv. 1028, supra note 42, at 1034. Of the cases cited in notes 154-59
supra, some evidence on the health and safety issues was mentioned in a few opinions; the
presumption of constitutionality was applied in all.
161. See, e.g., Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 47-48, 119 S.E.2d 833, 848 (1960).
162. See cases collected at Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222, at § 3 (1968). As acceptance of
aesthetics has grown, many courts have apparently abandoned attempts to ascertain
whether aesthetics is a "predominant" or "incidental" purpose. See, e.g., Kenyon Peck, Inc.
v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 64, 168 S.E.2d 117, 120 (1969): "Although aesthetic considerations
alone may not justify police regulations, the fact that they enter into the reasons for the
passage of an act or ordinance will not invalidate it if other elements within the scope of
police power are present."
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of health and safety is actually only a tangential objective of many
regulations that are upheld on health and safety grounds. While it
is conceivable, for example, that an unhoused recreational vehicle
in a residential area makes fire-fighting more difficult,16" the hypothetical blind man"" would probably not be offended by open-air
storage of such vehicles on the ground that it poses a threat to his
health and safety. If he were, he would likely be just as offended
by the garages required to house the vehicles, which may also
1
create fire hazards. "5
If the first inquiry is resolved in favor of the constitutionality
of a regulation that is alleged to protect public health and safety,
the next step is to determine whether the regulation is a reasonable means of furthering that objective. The regulation may be unreasonable if it fails to achieve the purpose for which it was intended, or if the public benefit from achieving the purpose is slight
compared to the private burden imposed by the regulation. 16" If it
is doubtful that the regulation actually promotes health and safety,
the regulation should be found unreasonable, unless aesthetics
alone is held to be a permissible purpose and the regulation is a
reasonable means of achieving the aesthetic objective. The presumption of constitutionality, however, allows the courts to avoid
the aesthetics issue and uphold regulations on attenuated, and possibly nonexistent, health and safety grounds.
The best examples of this subterfuge are cases in which the
courts uphold city-wide or state-wide prohibitions of, or restrictions on, advertising signs on the ground that such regulations promote traffic safety. 167 Studies of the relationship of advertising
signs to traffic safety have produced conflicting conclusions; some
163. See City of Euclid v. Fitzthum, 48 Ohio App. 2d 297, 357 N.E.2d 402 (1976), in
which the evidence of the city in support of such a regulation included fire prevention considerations. Id. at 301, 357 N.E.2d at 405. The regulation was held constitutional on its face,
but unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 299-302, 357 N.W.2d at 404-06; see City of Pepper
Pike v. Landskroner, 53 Ohio App. 2d 63, 71-72, 371 N.E.2d 579, 584 (1977).
164. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
165. See City of Euclid v. Fitzthum, 48 Ohio App. 2d 297, 357 N.E.2d 402 (1976)
(holding garage requirement unconstitutional as applied): "[Ilt is clear beyond peradventure
that enclosure may diminish health and safety factors by trapping sewage spillage from
portable sanitary facilities... and collecting highly flammable escaping propane gas which
would otherwise be dissipated in the air. .

. ."

Id. at 302, 357 N.E.2d at 406.

166. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164
Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980) (U.S. appealpending) (traffic safety an alternative ground for upholding regulation); Gosman v. Prince George's County, 41 Md. App. 479, 397 A.2d 630 (1979);
Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961) (relying also on the promotion of
tourism).
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have shown that a relationship between signs and traffic accidents
cannot be conclusively established, while others have found that
such signs do pose a safety hazard.' Since the evidence on behalf
of the contesting landowner, then, will be insufficient to take the
issue beyond the realm of "fair debate" and thereby overcome the
presumption of constitutionality, the courts will defer to the
legislative determination, disturbing it only if it is "manifestly
unreasonable."169
If the regulation of advertising signs is found to promote traffic safety, it should at least be acknowledged that the governmental interest in public safety, like the governmental interests in aesthetics and economic stability, varies in its significance from case
to case. Although the relationship between sign regulation and
traffic safety may be clear and supportable by convincing evidence
in some cases-for example, when the signs regulated are near interchanges"P-ethat relationship may not be so clear when the regulated signs are not in congested or dangerous areasY.7 For example, expert evidence that advertising signs in residential areas did
not affect traffic safety was presented in Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka,7 2 but the court upheld an ordinance prohibiting such signs solely on the ground that the regulation promoted the general welfare by protecting property values
and ensuring aesthetically pleasing residential areas. Often, however, any expert evidence that the contesting landowner may present on health or safety grounds will be insufficient to place the
issue beyond the realm of fair debate, and the presumption of constitutionality will cause the issue to be decided in favor of the
government.
168.

See generally Price, BillboardRegulation Along the InterstateHighway System,

8 U. KAN. L. Rav. 81, 87-88 (1959); 21 CLv. ST. L. REv., 194, 200 (May, 1972); 47

CORNELL

L.Q. 647, 648-49 (1962).
169. E.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 859, 610 P.2d 407,
412, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 515 (1980) (U.S. appeal pending). But cf. John Donnelly & Sons,
Inc. v. Outdoor Ad. Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975), in which the court, finding
"at best, conflicting support" for the proposition that sign regulation contributed to traffic
safety, upheld the regulation on the basis of aesthetics alone. Id. at 217, 339 N.E.2d at 717.
170. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47, 199 N.W.2d
525 (1972) (denial of variance to erect sign more than twenty feet in height affirmed; evi-

dence in record showed proposed sign near dangerous interstate exit would create traffic
hazard).
171. See 21 CLEV. ST. L. Rzv., supra note 168.
172.

281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
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III. THE

ROLE OF AESTHETICS IN BALANCING THE PUBLIC AND

PRIVATE INTERESTS: SUGGESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS

The foregoing discussion has identified two basic flaws in current analyses of the aesthetic regulation problem. First, the initial
constitutional inquiry-whether the regulation is aimed at a valid
police power purpose-is usually focused on an incidental and
often tenuous health and safety benefit of the regulation, or an economic benefit that is wholly derived from aesthetics and also
often tenuous. Second, the "fairly debatable" standard, creating a
strong presumption that the regulation is reasonably related to the
asserted purpose, impedes meaningful judicial review. As a result,
the purpose inquiry has been misdirected, and the relationship between means and end is at best tenuous. The end result is that the
contesting landowner faces an almost insurmountable burden of
proof.
Undoubtedly the most significant factor presently affecting
legislative and judicial treatment of aesthetic regulation is the
broadening of the general welfare justification to include such purposes as the protection of property values, the promotion of tourism, the preservation of the character and integrity of an area, the
promotion of the comfort and happiness of residents, and the like.
Moreover, the general welfare is now recognized as a valid basis for
regulation even if it is the sole basis. When such general welfare
considerations constitute the only basis for regulation, those courts
whose rule is that aesthetics may not be the sole or primary basis
for regulation are forced to give only lip service to that rule-if it
is to honor all the presumptions in favor of regulation and find it
valid.
The presumption of constitutionality should not be equivalent
to total abdication, however. Legislation was presumptively valid
when the aesthetics issue was still in its infancy; yet aesthetic regulation was seldom sustained on "nonaesthetic" grounds. In fact, it
is primarily the older cases that actually invalidated regulations on
the basis of the traditional rule. One writer has observed that the
attitude of early courts "almost amounted to a presumption of invalidity .... ,71 8 Even today, if the courts strictly required plaintiffs to meet the formal burden of proof, virtually no litigant could
be successful. Litigants are sometimes successful, however, and
courts do sometimes reject questionable justifications unsupported
173. Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27
S. CAL. L. RzV. 149, 171 (1954).
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by convincing evidence. 17 4 "[Tihe incident of success in these challenges ... is sufficient to suggest that the burden is less awesome

than the language employed to describe it." '75 As long as judicial
deference to legislative judgments is not complete abandonment of
the judicial functions, responsibility for those judgments remains
in part with the courts. "As long as judges do not fully and irrevocably repudiate the mission of occasionally rejecting majoritarian
political choices, there is no honest way for them to escape the
burdens of substantive judgment in every case.' 1 76 Courts are

more likely to reach proper substantive judgments in the aesthetic
regulation cases if they take a less deferential approach to the legislative decision. Rather than abandon all inquiry because the restriction is presumed constitutional, courts should assess the constitutionality of regulations by weighing the public and private
interests involved. A number of courts have employed the balancing test in assessing the validity of zoning legislation, particularly
in cases in which the landowner has alleged that the restriction
1
imposed an oppressive economic burden on his property. 7
Since all jurisdictions today recognize aesthetics as a legitimate police power objective-whether alone or in conjunction with
other purposes-it is only reasonable that the governmental interest in aesthetics be considered as a factor in favor of the validity of
aesthetic regulations. Both those jurisdictions that follow the traditional rule and those that accept aesthetics alone as a valid basis
for legislation should weigh this interest in the balancing process.
Giving this interest weight, however, does not mean that the regulation should be presumed constitutional. This Article has argued
that the governmental interests involved in primarily aesthetic regulation, including aesthetics, the protection of property values, the
promotion of tourism, and incidental health or safety benefits, vary
in significance from case to case, depending particularly on the nature and location of the regulated use. These variations must be
taken into account in balancing the significance of the governmental interests furthered by the regulation against the significance of
174. See text accompanying notes 183-93 infra.
175. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, § 3.23 at 129.
176. L. TRmE, Am.imcAN CONsTmuIoNAL LAW 454 (1978) (emphasis in original).
177. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, § 3.23. A difficulty exists, however, in following the
approach suggested here and in note 53 supra-i.e., refusing to apply the presumption in
cases involving primarily aesthetic regulation. The difficulty is that a court must be willing
to determine whether a regulation is primarily aesthetic as the threshold inquiry. All that
should be required for this determination, however, is a common sense application of the
simple blind man test, as described in the text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
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the private interests in freedom from regulation. When aesthetics
and its derivative economic benefits are the only governmental interests at stake, those interests might be sufficient to justify regulating a junkyard-a use once classified by the Ohio courts as
"patently offensive.'1 7 8 Conversely, the governmental interest in
aesthetics, standing alone, is probably not significant enough to
support a regulatory veto of a contemporary home in a neighborhood of traditional homes; the unaesthetic impact, quoting
Michelman, is "unobvious, debatable, and apparently idiosyncratic.' 117 9 Thus, even when aesthetics is concededly a valid police
power purpose, it is not at all clear in the latter case that the challenged regulation is a reasonable means of furthering that end.
Whether the regulation is a reasonable means of achieving the aesthetic objective becomes increasingly less certain as the unaesthetic impact of the regulated use becomes less obvious. Nevertheless,
if the derivative economic benefit of the aesthetic regulation is significant, the governmental interests in the regulation should outweigh the landowner's interests. Similar reasoning should apply to
aesthetic regulations that have incidental health and safety
benefits.
The private interests will of course vary in significance from
case to case as well. In addition to the landowner's interest in freedom from restrictions on the use of his property unless the restriction has a substantial relation to health, safety, morals, or general
welfare,8 0 the first amendment rights of the landowner are relevant if the regulated use is a protected mode of expression.
Signs,' 8 1 for example, and even architectural design 82 may enjoy
178. See also text accompanying note 139 supra; State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128,
243 N.E.2d 66 (1968).
179. Michelman, supra note 46, at 42.
180. This interest might be termed a right of privacy or autonomy. See note 204 infra.
181. It is now considered established that ordinances prohibiting off-site billboards do
not violate the first amendment, since the United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Suffolk Outdoor Ad. Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 402 N.Y.S.2d 368
(1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 808 (1978), for want of a substantial federal question.
The court in Suffolk had upheld a community-wide ban on off-site billboards. "Since the
Supreme Court regards the dismissal of an appeal as a decision on the merits ... the high
court has resolved that a prohibition of off-site billboards does not violate the [f]irst
[a]mendment." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 867, 610 P.2d 407,
417, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 520 (1980) (U.S. appeal pending) (citation omitted) (holding the
Court's previous commercial speech cases [e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809 (1975)] not inconsistent with ordinances prohibiting off-site billboards). Aesthetic regulations extend to many other types of signs, however, such as political signs, Farrell v.
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some measure of first amendment protection. The extent to which
the regulation imposes an economic burden upon the private party
should also be considered. Regulations that, for example, require a
junkyard owner to build a fence undoubtedly raise the cost of doing business. In New York, where aesthetics is permissible as a sole
purpose of regulation, the supreme court has held that if the economic burden to the landowner outweighs the governmental interest in aesthetics, the regulation is invalid. 188
A condition to the accuracy of this balancing process is the
willingness of courts to weigh carefully the actual significance of
each factor rather than blindly assuming the existence of economic
or health and safety justifications. A few courts have already rejected that assumption. In the landmark case of People v. Stover,184 the city alleged that it had prohibited clotheslines in front
and side yards in order to facilitate access for fire-fighting equipment and to promote traffic safety. The court, however, questioned
whether the ordinance in fact served safety purposes and instead
sustained it on aesthetic and economic grounds.188 In John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board,186 the court rejected defendant's claim that its ban on off-premises advertising
signs had been enacted for public safety and traffic control purposes. 18 7 The ordinance was nonetheless upheld because aesthetics

alone justified this exercise of the police power. In Farrellv. Township of Teaneck, 88 the Superior Court of New Jersey refused to
Township of Teaneck, 126 N.J. Super. 460, 315 A.2d 424 (1974), and "for sale" and "sold"
signs, Berg Agency v. Township of Maplewood, 163 N.J. Super. 542, 395 A.2d 261 (1978).
182. For a thorough discussion of the problem of freedom of expression in the context
of aesthetic regulation see Williams, supra note 37. Of course, many land uses that might be
thought "unaesthetic" will not be modes of expression warranting first amendment protection, including, for example, solar collectors. See Jones, Aesthetic Restriction and the Use
of Solar Devices, 8 ENvT'rL AFF. 33 (1979).
183. See Chusud Realty Corp. v. Village of Kensington, 40 Misc. 2d 259, 243 N.Y.S.2d
149 (1963), af'd, 22 App. Div. 2d 895, 255 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1964). The regulation in Village of
Kensington restricted land to residential use in an area that was unsuitable for such
purposes.
184. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42
(1963).
185. Id. at 466, 191 N.E.2d.at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 737:
Although there may be considerable doubt whether there is a sufficiently reasonable
relationship between clotheslines and traffic or fire safety to support an exercise of the
police power, it is our opinion that the ordinance may be sustained as an attempt to
preserve the residential appearance of the city and its property values by banning, insofar as practicable, unsightly clotheslines from yards abutting a public street.
186. 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975).
187. Id. at 217-18, 339 N.E.2d at 716-17.
188. 126 N.J. Super. 460, 462, 315 A.2d 424, 425-26 (1974).
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assume that political signs in residential areas reduced property
values in the absence of any objective evidence on the issue.
In Berg Agency v. Township of Maplewood, 8s the New Jersey
Superior Court also rejected defendants' contention that a sign
control ordinance protected property values. Plaintiffs, a real estate agency and a homeowner, challenged the constitutionality of
the ordinances of three municipalities: one prohibited "for sale"
and "sold" signs; the second regulated the size and location of such
signs; and the third regulated the size and location of "for sale"
signs and prohibited "sold" signs. Finding a first amendment right
of free access to information implicated in the "for sale" signs,19
the court considered the cities' contention that the governmental
interests in aesthetics and the protection of property values outweighed the first amendment interest of plaintiffs. The cities also
argued that, under New Jersey law, regulation for aesthetic purposes alone, even without an accompanying effect on property values, was valid. 19 1 In response, the court stated,
It is not now necessary for the court to decide whether zoning legislation
drafted to promote aesthetics must as well have the effect of preserving property values. Suffice it to say that if such legislation in fact preserves property
values as it promotes aesthetics, this fact may be considered in weighing the
significance of the legislation against the [f]irst [a]mendment infringement.",2

The only evidence that the signs had a detrimental effect on
property values was the testimony of the cities' expert witnesses,
real estate brokers. The court found this evidence unconvincing,
because "no objective evidence was submitted to corroborate such
opinions, as, for example, the instability of property values in
other communities that do not have restrictive sign ordinances." 19
Rather than concluding that an aesthetic regulation without economic impact is invalid, the court weighed the aesthetic interest
alone against the first amendment interest and found all three ordinances invalid with regard to the "for sale" signs:
In analyzing the sufficiency of aesthetic considerations alone, it must be kept
in mind that although a governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle the free flow of
necessary truthful information when the legitimate end can be more narrowly
achieved.1 "
189. 163 N.J. Super. 542, 395 A.2d 261 (1978).
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 549-55, 395 A.2d at 265-68.
Id. at 557, 395 A.2d at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 558, 395 A.2d at 269.
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The prohibition and regulation of "sold" signs, however, was
found constitutional. Since the evidence showed that the principal
purpose of such signs was to advertise the broker, rather than to
impart valuable information to the public, the court found that the
governmental interest in aesthetics outweighed any first amendment right.19 5
It is interesting to note the role that economic impact played
in the Berg Agency decision. In the case of the "sold" signs, in
which no significant first amendment interest was implicated, defendants were not required to show economic impact. The governmental interest in aesthetics was sufficient by itself to outweigh the
landowner's interest in unrestricted use of his land. 1 " Regarding
the "for sale" signs, however, which did involve significant speech
interests, the lack of evidence pertaining to property values may
have been dispositive. Perhaps, if the cities had been able to add
an economic interest to the aesthetic interest, the scales would
have tipped in their favor, but aesthetics alone was not enough.
The balancing process employed by the Berg Agency court
should be followed by all courts confronted with constitutional
challenges to aesthetic regulations, regardless of whether they adhere to the majority or minority view on the sufficiency of aesthetic
purposes. In majority rule jurisdictions, however-those that hold
that aesthetics alone is not sufficient-courts should refuse to presume the validity of "nonaesthetic" regulations. Instead, these majority rule courts must critically examine the claimed purposes of
challenged regulations. Otherwise, they will fail to identify those
regulations based on aesthetics alone, unaccompanied by derivative economic benefits or health and safety benefits. Once the court
recognizes that the actual aim of the restriction is aesthetic, the
balancing process should end except in those jurisdictions that
hold aesthetics alone to be sufficient. In these jurisdictions, the
balancing test continues to determine whether the aesthetic inter1
est alone is significant enough to outweigh the private interests.

9

195. Id. at 559, 395 A.2d at 270.
196. It should be noted that apparently the plaintiffs did not argue that the regulations would not have a beautifying effect. In fact, in 1972, in implementing a "MAKE
AMERICA BEAUTIFUL" program, the local Board of Realtors had requested the cities to
prohibit all signs in residential zones. Id. at 547, 395 A.2d at 264.
197. The governmental interest in aesthetics may be viewed as less significant than
other possible governmental interests, although that fact alone will not preclude application
of the balancing test. See De Sena v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 379
N.E.2d 1144, 1146, 408 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15-16 (1978) (citations omitted): "[Wlhen denial of a
variance is sought to be justified on aesthetic grounds, the public interest in regulation is
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It is this necessary but difficult task of judging aesthetics from
which the courts following the traditional rule have recoiled. A major reason has been the undeniably subjective nature of aesthetics.
Whereas public health and safety "submit to reasonable definition
and delimitation," 1 8 no objective criteria are available to measure
the reasonableness of the aesthetic judgment or the significance of
the governmental interest in aesthetics in any particular case. The
courts must rely either on what they perceive as aesthetic, on what
they believe the community perceives as aesthetic,t1 " or on evidence that has not heretofore been employed in any case-the testimony of "experts" on aesthetics. 00 Each measure has its shortcomings; the courts either are forced to become super art critics or
risk misperceiving the communities' aesthetic values, or the "experts" may not reflect those values. 01
Apart from the subjectivity issue, much concern has been expressed about the extent to which allowing the government to legislate aesthetics permits a sort of "big-brother" intrusion into private and personal matters. Some commentators have suggested
that aesthetics is no more subjective than a number of other concepts with which the courts deal regularly, such as "justice," "fairness," or "reasonableness. 2 02 When the importance of those concepts is compared to the importance of aesthetics, however, the
analogy is considerably less persuasive. The traditional police
power purposes of protecting the public health, safety, and morals
are central to our system of laws, whereas aesthetics is something
of a "luxury" and an "indulgence. ' 20 8 In his dissent in People v.
Stover, Judge Van Voorhis doubted that such indulgent motives
not necessarily as strong as in those cases involving threats to the public safety. .. and care
must be taken lest the State 'trespass through aesthetics on the human personality." The
denial of the variance was overruled on other grounds.
198. Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 181, 180 N.E. 767, 773 (1932).
199. See Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and the Judicial Decision
Process, 35 Mo. L. REv. 176, 184 (1970), suggesting that community desires should be discovered, perhaps by survey and voting, prior to the enactment of aesthetic regulation.
200. This suggestion was considered and rejected in 13 HAST. L.J. 374, 376 (1962).
201. "[T]he opinion of the ["expert"] jury as to beauty might not represent the average person's viewpoint, which, in a final sense, is the essential principle in justifying aesthetics as a valid consideration under the police power." Id. at 376.
202. See Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 226-27. "Beauty cannot be any more precisely
defined than wealth, property, malice, or a host of multiordinal words to which courts are
accustomed." Id. See also Williams, supra note 37, at 16. "[I]t seems doubtful that any
material difference exists between the verifiability of aesthetic as opposed to ethical or political values." Id.
203. See City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Ad. & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L.
285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (1905).
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could justify governmental restrictions on the use of private
property:
The avoidance by courts, sometimes seemingly to the point of evasion, of sustaining the constitutionality of zoning solely on aesthetic grounds has had its
origin in a wholesome fear of allowing government to trespass through aesthetics on the human personality ...
[T]o prohibit [the Stovers' property
use] by law upon the ground that it offends the aesthetic sensibilities of the
neighbors or of the public officials of the municipality means. . . opening the
door to the invasion by majority rule of a great deal of territory that belongs
to the individual human being. 20

The fact that so many jurisdictions continue to cling to the traditional rule indicates that most courts are genuinely concerned that
aesthetic regulation constitutes interference into matters about
which the government should have no say. This regulation is considered by some to be a "trespass . . . on the human personality, ' 20 5 a discouragement of artistic nonconformity,30 6 and a first
step toward "a most highly regulated society ... at the whim and
caprice of individual officials without any proper measure for a
204. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 472-73, 191 N.E.2d 272, 278, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 742 (Van Voorhis,
J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
The broader argument that government should not restrict any conduct except to prevent harm to others was made influentially by John Stuart Mill. J.S. MxL, ON LmERTY
(Oxford ed. 1947) (1st ed. London 1859). Using language that might be applied to describe
governmental enforcement of a popular determination that a particular land use is "unaesthetic," Mill complained against proscriptions of conduct causing no harm to others on the
basis of majoritarian views of morality: "[T]he strongest of all the arguments against the
interference of the public with purely personal conduct is that, when it does interfere, the
odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place.... [T]he opinion of [the] majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as
likely to be wrong as right. . . ." Id. at 74-75. In more concrete legal terms than those used
by Judge Van Voorhis in Stover, it has been argued that the right of privacy, as developed
in such cases as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), provides protection for the expression of one's personality via residential architecture. See Note, 28 STAN. L. REV. 179, supra note 94, at 184-85. But see Williams, supra note
37, at 50-57 (arguing that a landowner's rights of privacy and autonomy, at least at the
present stage of the development of those rights, add little, if anything, to the protection
afforded by the first amendment).
205. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 472, 191 N.E.2d 272, 278, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 742
(Van Voorhis, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
206. Judge Corrigan expressed his disapproval of compelling conformity via aesthetic
regulation in a series of rhetorical questions:
Should the appellant be required to sacrifice her choice of architectural plan for her
property under the official municipal juggernaut of conformity...? Should her aesthetic sensibilities in connection with her selection of design for her proposed home be
stifled because of the apparent belief in this community of the group as a source of
creativity? Is she to sublimate herself in this group and suffer the frustration of individual creative aspirations?
Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 76, 192 N.E.2d 74, 81 (1963) (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
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"...
,207
limitation .
Substantial reasons exist for disapproving regulations based
on aesthetics alone, but if the courts are to give any effect to the
rule they must at the same time avoid imprudent assumptions of
"nonaesthetic" justifications. In cases in which the "nonaesthetic"
justification is the protection of property values, the courts should
require objective evidence of that asserted governmental interest,
as did the court in Berg Agency. In cases in which such evidence
might be impossible to obtain, as in the architectural design review
cases, 08 the courts should at least require the best available evidence, such as the reactions of neighbors who might be likely to
sell if the design is approved, and the testimony of objective appraisers. 0 It must also be recognized that although the likelihood
of a detrimental impact on property values increases in proportion
to the ugliness of a proposed structure, this is not always the case.

It is axiomatic... that the most expensive house in an area suffers in relative market value while its less expensive neighbors gain. Thus, presumably,
the construction of a monstrosity worth $200,000 on a street of $30,000
houses might well preserve
or even enhance property values while destroying
10
pleasant surroundings.

In cases in which the asserted "nonaesthetic" justification is
the promotion of tourism, the courts should consider the extent to
which the regulation restricts unaesthetic property uses in areas
that are not in fact benefited by tourist dollars. It should be noted
that, at least in some commercial areas, "unaesthetic" uses such as
outdoor advertising contribute to the urban "hustle and bustle,"
which in turn attracts tourists.211
Finally, the courts should not permit the presumption of constitutionality to foreclose inquiry into incidental and tenuous
207. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47, 57, 199 N.W.2d 525,
531 (1972) (Targonski, J., concurring).
208. See text accompanying notes 99-109 supra.
209. See Turnbull, supra note 95, at 245.
210. 59 Nw. U. L. Rzv. 372, supra note 94, at 389. The supposed correlation of property values and aesthetics may be nonexistent in other situations, as when apartments,
unaesthetic by some standards, are proposed to be built in a single-family residential area.
While existing homes may decline in value, vacant land suitable for apartments may increase in value. Id. at 389-90. While such cases are clearly contrary to a major thesis of this
paper-that the economic benefits of a regulation are wholly derived from the aesthetic
benefits of the regulation-they must be recognized as aberrational.
211. See Lucking, supra note 151, at 188. "In a predominantly commercial zone, the
billboard thrusts its message at an audience willing and eager to participate in the marketplace. Yet a broadly drawn ordinance could conceivably prohibit outdoor advertising in
Times Square." Id.
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health and safety justifications that may be asserted as the basis
for aesthetic regulation. Defendants may assert, for example, that
they restrict outdoor advertising in order to promote traffic safety,
that they require solid fencing around junkyards to prevent injuries to trespassing children, and that they require recreational vehicles to be garaged rather than parked on the street in order to
facilitate fire-fighting. Such assertions may have no factual basis in
some cases, and even if some factual basis exists, the significance
of the governmental interest in health and safety will obviously
vary from case to case. For example, advertising signs located in
residential or uncongested areas may have little or no effect on
traffic safety;212 chain link fences may protect children from the
hazards of junkyards equally as well as fences that completely obscure public view of junkyards;1 3 and a garage in which a recreational vehicle is housed may pose as great a fire hazard as the vehicle itself poses unhoused 2 1 Regulations such as those mentioned,
however, cannot be dealt with for what they are-that is, based
solely or primarily on aesthetics-unless the courts refuse to presume the existence of alleged health and safety justifications and
instead require that the validity of the justifications be proved by
evidence.
Rigid adherence to the rule that aesthetics may not be the sole
or primary justification for regulation would compel the courts to
invalidate regulations whose only purpose is aesthetics, regardless
212. See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Ad. Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 495,
162 N.W.2d 206, 209-10 (1968), in which expert testimony showed that billboards in residential areas did not constitute safety or traffic hazards. See also 21 CLv. ST.L. Rav., supra
note 168.
213. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Haymond in Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22,
50-77, 119 S.E.2d 833, 849-63 (1960). The majority held that a statute requiring that junkyards be enclosed by a fence "so constructed and maintained as to obscure the junk...
from ordinary view to those persons passing upon the public highways," id. at 24, 119 S.E.2d
at 835, was valid, basing its decision in part on health and safety reasons. The majority
quoted statements from the defendant State Road Commissioner's brief: "'It is established
that disabled and junked automobiles most generally retain quantities of gasoline and oil
which produce a fire hazard or a trap for children playing with fire. The old junked 'icebox'
has made more than one headline-as a death trap for a playful child.' "Id. at 47, 119 S.E.2d
at 848. The majority also used several paragraphs to describe the presumption of constitutionality attached to legislative acts. Id. at 32-35, 119 S.E.2d at 840-41. The dissent, classifying the statute as one based on aesthetics alone, pointed out that there was "nothing in the
record.., that indicate[d]... that the junkyards [were] unsafe, immoral, or detrimental
to the health or the general welfare ....
" Id. at 56, 119 S.E.2d at 852 (Haymond, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
214. See City of Euclid v. Fitzthum, 48 Ohio App. 2d 297, 302, 357 N.E.2d 402, 406
(1976), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 163-65.

19811

AESTHETIC REGULATION

of the significance of that interest in any particular case. Moreover,
such adherence might also require invalidation in any case in
which the governmental interests are only aesthetics and the derivative economic benefits of aesthetics, or aesthetics and secondary
health and safety benefits, since in such cases the primary justification for regulation must be aesthetics. 15 If promotion of the general welfare is to have any meaning at all in jurisdictions following
the majority rule, however, general welfare must be interpreted to
include economic stability. This governmental interest can and
should be recognized as legitimate, but the significance of the interest should be carefully examined rather than presumed.
An increasing number of jurisdictions recognize that even if
the only governmental interest at stake is aesthetics, that interest
may be significant enough to justify regulation. Sound arguments
in favor of accepting aesthetics alone as a permissible police power
purpose have been made by numerous writers 1 and need not be
repeated here. Suffice it to say that the promotion of aesthetic values yields intangible benefits, such as furthering civic pride and
the happiness and emotional stability of residents, that may be
sufficient justification in themselves for regulation, even if not
translatable into economic benefits.1 7 The problems posed by assuming the existence of "nonaesthetic" grounds are not as great in
jurisdictions following the rule that aesthetics alone may be a sufficient basis for regulation, since "nonaesthetic" grounds are not essential to the validity of the regulation. Those courts that recognize aesthetics alone as a permissible basis for regulation need
never invalidate a regulation on the ground that it exceeds permissible police power purposes. Their focus instead should be on the
reasonableness of the regulation, that is, whether the aesthetic purpose to which the regulation is reasonably related outweighs the
private burdens imposed by the regulation.2 1 8 During the reasonableness inquiry, however, imprudent application of the presumption of constitutionality must be avoided to ensure that the balancing process may be undertaken properly. As has been shown, the
215.
benefits.
216.

See Michelman, supra note 46, concerning the derivative nature of economic
See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 10; 1 R. ANDmtSON, supra note 15, § 7.25. See

also Anderson, Regulation of Land Use for Aesthetic Purposes-AnAppraisalof People v.
Stover, 15 SYRACusE L. Rxv. 33 (1963-64).
217.

See Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 231. But cf. Turnbull, supra note 95, at 248-53

(arguing, in essence, that all benefits of aesthetic regulation have economic underpinnings).
218. See note 15 supra.
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significance of the governmental interest in aesthetics varies from
case to case;2 19 if aesthetics is not only the sole governmental interest served by a regulation but is also a relatively insignificant one,
it will surely be outweighed by competing private interests in many
cases.2 2 In such cases, when it is clear that the governmental interest served is minor at best, a presumption of validity for the regulation in question is illogical and undesirable.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Serious problems are presented by cases in which the courts
uphold regulations based solely or primarily on aesthetics- without admitting it-by relying on presumed or even nonexistent
"nonaesthetic" grounds. In such cases, the courts shirk their responsibility to deal with the real issues involved, and litigants are
not afforded a fair review of their constitutional claims. As
Dukeminier stated in his assessment of the problem in 1955: "Are
not the defects of a legal system in which words do not match actions, in which the gap between myth and decision is great, many
and patent?"'2 1 Since the time that Dukeminier wrote, the problem has grown to far greater proportions as the definition of the
general welfare has expanded to provide convenient subterfuges for
aesthetics. A new approach to the problem must be taken by the
courts if this trend is to be halted. The courts should either accept
aesthetics alone as a proper basis for police power regulation or
give more than mere lip service to the rule that aesthetics alone is
insufficient.
While the acceptance of an "aesthetics alone" rationale facilitates reasonable analysis and is an eminently sensible recognition
of the importance of aesthetics, it has not been the purpose of this
Article to condemn the traditional rule. Rather, it is conceded that
courts may for sound reasons find that governmental regulation of
the use of private property for aesthetic purposes alone is unwarranted. What is needed, however, is for those courts to examine
more critically the governmental interests served by regulation and
to refuse to presume the existence of "nonaesthetic" purposes
when in fact none exists. Aesthetics has a proper role in the balancing process that should be employed under either the majority
or minority rule, but unless that role is openly recognized and its
219. See text accompanying notes 138-39, 151, 178-79 supra.
220. See, e.g., Lucking, supra note 151.
221. Dukeminier, supra note 10, at 232.
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significance carefully assessed, any distinction between the two
rules is meaningless.

